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INTRODUCTION
Children, as well as adults, often make judgments about other
people.

These judgments may involve assessment of other's intentions,

attitudes, emotions, ideas, and even personality attributes.

Our

judgments about others are important, for they are one of the determinants of the way we interact with others.

For example, we behave

differently towards a person we judge as "kind" than we do towards a
person we judge as "cruel."

One of the keys to understanding human

behavior, then, is to understand how people make social judgments
about others.
Social judgments are largely based on information provided by
direct or indirect observations of people.
clude

For example, we may con-

that Person A likes or dislikes Person B by directly observing

Person A's treatment of Person B or by indirectly receiving information about Person A's attitudes (e.g., a third party might tell us
that Person A dislikes Person B).

However, the person making the

social judgment may or may not use all of the information available.
In the above example, it is possible that we may choose not to select
hearsay evidence as a basis of our impression, and instead rely on
our own observations.
Once the observer selects the information deemed necessary to
make a judgment, the information must be organized into a final
impression.

That is, when making social judgments, we usually do

1
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not list behavioral observations or information coming from various
sources, but organize it into judgments that explain or "sum-up" the
selected information.

For example, if I see John hit Fred and kick

his dog, I might conclude that John has an aggressive nature or that
he is angry.

This judgment is based on John's behaviors which are

oraanized
or "explained" by concluding he is aggressive or feeling
0
angry.

By themselves, the actual behaviors tell us little about John.

Only by examining both behaviors and their internal relationships
(i.e., aggressiveness) can we make an inference about John's mood or
personality.

Selection and organization of information, then, appear

intrinsic to social judgments.
Although both children and adults may observe or be given the
same information about others, it cannot be assumed that children and
adults will select the same information on which to base their
impressions.

Nor can it be assumed that both children and adults will

organize their selected information in the same manner in forming
their judgments.

It is plausible that cognitive limitations of

younger children might influence social judgments by affecting the
selection and organizational processes.

The present studies inves-

tigate these possibilities.
Cognitive Phases of Development
Piaget (1932) asserts that children go through several sequential phases in the development of their cognitive abilities.

Each

phase is qualitatively different from the others, characterized by
differential capacities in dealing with the environment.

Three

3

phases of cognitive development are of special importance to social
judgments.
The first is the "preoperational" phase which occurs approximately between the ages of two to seven years.

One pervasive char-

acteristic of this phase is that of "egocentrism," which means
children's thoughts are centered on their own points of view, and
thus, they are unable to conceive of the world from other people's
perspectives.

Gradually children relinquish their egocentric or uni-

dimensional perspectives and begin to realize that their perceptions
of a situation may be different from others.

This occurs during the

phase of "concrete operations" which usually emerges around the
seventh year and terminates during the ages of approximately eleven
to twelve.

During the succeeding "formal operations" phase, children

can consider possible events in addition to actual ones.

They are

able not only to think of actual relations, but also become capable
of considering hypothetical events and relationships that might occur.
In one illustration of how cognitive abilities affect judgments,
Piaget (1932) asserts that preoperational children base their moral
judgments on the objective consequences of transgressions, as opposed
to concrete operational children who examine the intentions of the
transgressor.

Preoperational children bound by an egocentric per-

spective do not have the cognitive abilities to. examine both consequences and intentions in making their judgments.

Concrete operation-

al children, not limited by an egocentric perspective, can examine
both types of information and base their judgments on the less
salient intentionality information.

As empirical support, Hebble
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(1971), using hypothetical stories, varied both the consequences of
an action and the behavioral intentions of the actor.

Piaget's

hypotheses were confirmed in that the children operating at the preoperational level based their judgments primarily on the consequences
of the action and largely ignored the intentions of the transgressor.
For example, an actor who accidentally broke several dishes was Judged
"naughtier" than an actor who intentionally broke one.

Children

operating at the concrete operational level rated the actor as less
"naughty" than did the preoperational children when the intentions
were good, regardless of the consequences of.the action.

Hebble

concluded that children operating at the concrete operational level
have the cognitive ability to assess intentionality when making moral
judgments.

Children operating at the preoperational level, however,

have not developed this capacity.
More recent research (e.g., Darley, Klosson, & Zanna, 1978;
Chandler, Greenspan, & Barenboim, 1973), however, contends that
younger children do have the capacity to consider intentionality
information when making moral judgments.

Nevertheless, a "Piagetian"

perspective might explain any inability of preoperational children
to take account of an actor's intentions as resulting from their
egocentric or unidimensional perspectives.

That is, preoperational

children's highly centered logic permits them to attend to only one
aspect or dimension of a situation at one time.

Since the conse-

quences of an action are more salient than the intentions of the
actor, it is not surprising that preoperational children often base
their judgments on the consequences.

Concrete operational children,
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however, have acquired the ability to "decenter" or attend to several
aspects of a situation simultaneously.

This ability permits concrete

children to shift their attention away from the objective consequences
of an action to permit greater assessment of the actor's intentions.

The Development of Social Judgments
In addition to moral judgments, social judgments might also be
influenced by the child's cognitive capacities.

For example, dispo-

sitional judgments might be affected by cognitive abilities.

Kelley's

attribution theory (1967) states that to the extent that a person's
behaviors do not vary over time and situations, an observer can be
confident that the behaviors are reflective of some personality
attribute and not the situation.

It is possible that a child's ego-

centric perspective may limit examination of this behavioral consistency, consequently affecting judgments.

Ernest (1976) examined

this attribution process by presenting children with a series of
three behaviors which an actor was said to have performed (e.g., "John
hit Tim," "John kicked Ken," "John gave Gary a present").

On the

basis. of this behavioral information, the child made dispositional
judgments about the actor's "goodness" or "badness."

Differences

were found between preoperational and concrete operational children
in how they dealt with consistent and inconsistent behavioral sequences.

Specifically, preoperational children (mean age

6~5

years)

had a harder time integrating inconsistent behavioral information
(e.g., two positive behaviors and a negative behavior), than concrete
operational and formal operational children (respective mean ages

6

9 ,7 and 19,8 years).

Ernest concluded that the preoperational

children's egocentric perspectives limited their ability to think
about others as possessing both good and bad dispositional characteristics.

Expecting others to be absolutely good or absolutely bad,

preoperational children failed to integrate inconsistent behaviors
into judgments that reflected all of the information.
Earlier researchers also have concluded that with age and cognitive development, children do become more complex in making social
judgments.

For example, Gollin (1958) found that older children are

better able to integrate varied information about a person than younger
children.

The paradigm involved assessment of sequentially filmed

scenes depicting a child behaving in socially desirable manners
followed by socially undesirable behaviors.

Three groups of subjects

(mean ages 10,7; 13,6 and 16,6 years) were asked what they thought
of the child and what they had seen him do.

Responses were scored

according to whether or not they used inferences and concepts in
their reports.

An "inference" was credited to subjects if they

attempted to go beyond the information presented and described some
underlying motive or situation that accounted for one of the actions
in the film.

Subjects were credited with a "concept" if they

attempted to relate and integrate conflicting features in the other
person's behavior.

Results showed an increase with age in the use

of both "inferences" and "concepts," indicating that the ability to
relate and organize information about other people follows a developmental sequence.
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Another indication of developmental changes in social judgments
is provided by Livesley and Bromley (1973).

They asked subjects of

various ages to describe eight people known to them:

a man, woman,

boy, and girl they liked; and a man, woman, boy, and girl they disliked.

For the purpose of a content analysis, the descriptions were

divided into "units."

Each unit was a statement or idea defined as

one item of information referring directly or indirectly to the other
person.

Experimenters then assigned these units to one of two types

of statements--central or peripheral.

Central statements included

references to personal qualities and general habits.

Peripheral

statements referred to appearance, identity (e.g., age, sex, residence), social roles, possessions, details of family and so on.
Results indicated that older children (mean age 8,6 years) used more
central statements in their descriptions than younger children (mean
age 6,7 years).

This change in strategy in impression formation

between the ages of seven and eight years was interpreted by Livesley
and Bromley as resulting from the child's relinquishment of egocentrism.

As children become capable of inferential thought, they in-

tegrate events separated in time, and find underlying regularities,
similarities, and consistencies in the other's behaviors.
Although cognitive abilities appear to affect social judgments,
it is not clear how these abilities specifically affect the selection
and organization processes.

That is, it is not clear whether sub-

jects at different cognitive levels of development select different
information as a basis of their judgments; select the same
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information, but organize it in different ways; or both, differently
select and organize information.

Further, if selection and organi-

zational processes are different, it is not apparent how cognitive
abilities influence or shape these processes.

Part of the reason

why these issues have not been resolved may lie in the studies themselves, since there have been wide variations across studies in the
sources and types of information given, and in the kinds of judgments
the subjects are asked to make.

For example, some studies give

behavioral information orally, while others allow the subject to
directly observe the actor's actions.

Some present information per-

taining to the actor's intentions, while other studies give information pertaining to the actor's feelings.

Further, some studies ask

for dispositional judgments, while others ask the subject to make
moral judgments.

Although examining variations in types of informa-

tion and judgments is important, it obscures the basic cognitive
processes by which the judgments are made.

Research is needed that

toore clearly delineates the selection and organizational processes,
while more tightly controlling the nature of the information on which
the judgments are based.
Information Integration Theory
Anderson (1974) has developed a model through which these
selection and organization processes might be studied systematically.
His paradigm involves presenting a series of trait adjectives (e.g.,

"·
n1ce, "" intelligent")

to subjects and asking them to rate the

"likability" of a person characterized by these traits.

The advantage
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of this trait approach is that it allows clear control over the
nature of the stimulus materials.

Specifically, by obtaining the

"likability" ratings of each trait word independent of all other
words, it is possible to investigate the processes by which judgments
are made.

Other techniques (e.g., presentation of behaviors by

videotape) are less adaptable to exploration of these processes since
the stimulus materials often vary on a number of dimensions.

For

example, "good" and "bad" behaviors may differ not only in their
evaluative goodness, but in affective cues (e.g., facial regard)
elicited by the actor.

Although trait words may also vary on dimen-

sions other than likability (e.g., trait stability: Edwards & Ernest,
1976), this should present no systematic confounds if judgments are
made on the same dimension on which the individual traits were rated.
That is, if judgments of likability are based on traits independently
rated for likabili·ty, other trait characteristics should not systematically affect this overall judgment.
Anderson (1974) proposes two operations involved in information
integration theory which parallel the processes of selection and
organization.

The first is that of "valuation" which might be con-

sidered one of stimulus selection.

Specifically, any judgment

requires a preliminary evaluation of the meaning and relevance of the
stimuli for the task at hand.

The role of the valuation operation is

to determine what the stimuli (i.e., traits) mean and how much importance is to be given to them.

Previous usage of the term "selection"

has emphasized the importance judges place on information.

The use
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of the term "valuation" is more global since it implies that judges
also extract what the unit of information actually means.

Once the

information is evaluated, it has to be organized or combined into an
overall judgment.

This second operation is that of "integration."

Generally, people appear to combine information by "averaging" the
individual values of each unit of information on whatever dimension
the overall judgment is being made.
Anderson (1974) proposes an algebraic model by which both the
valuation and integration processes can be represented.

Social judg-

ments then can be understood as a product of basic mathematical
operations.

Two stimulus parameters have special importance to these

mathematical operations:

scale value and weight.

As previously

indicated, the scale value of a stimulus trait can be considered as
the location of the stimulus on some dimension of judgment.

The

concept of "weight" can be viewed as the amount of information a
given trait represents or how important it is relative to other information.

Of course, both weight and scale value will depend on the

dimension of judgment.

The same stimulus trait may have different

importance and meaning for different judgmental tasks.

Each task sets

up a valuation operation by virtue of which the scale values and
weights are defined.

The values given to these stimulus parameters

are determined by the valuation process.

Variations in this valuation

process, however, can be found among individuals.

The scale values

and weights assigned to particular traits then may vary across subjects.

These variations may be due to a variety of factors, including
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differences in learned trait associations, situations, and even
cognitive abilities (c.f., Kaplan, 1975).
Mathematically, an averaging model represents the integration
operation.

Thus, both the valuation and integration process are

represented by the following equation:
N

N

R = (w 0 s 0 + r
wisi)
i=l

I

(

wi

L

i=l

+

w )
0

(1)

The final judgment "R" is based on "N" stimulus traits with scale
values "s" and weight "w."

Scale value is defined as the quantita-

tive representation of the location of the information on a particular
judgment dimension, and "weight" as the functional importance of a
given stimulus for the required judgment.
is assumed to be equal to 1.
(s 0 ) and -.Jeight (w 0

)

The sum of the weights

These components include a scale value

for an initial impression, which is the judge's

impression of the person prior to receiving any information about him
--that is, an impression based on no information.

The final judgment,

then, is the weighted average of the scale values of the stimulus
information and initial impression.
A number of studies have empirically supported the weighted
average model for adults.

For example, Anderson (1965) presented

six types of trait sets to subjects:

two highly likable traits (HH),

two traits of medium high likability (~), two traits of medium
low likability (~M-), two traits of low likability (LL), and cornbinat ions of the a b ove ( 1.e.,
·

H.~.+..+
~l'M';

If some type· of

averaging mechanism were operative, it would be expected that the
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sets Composed of evaluatively different stimulus combinations would
have been rated somewhere between their isovalent components.
critical comparisons confirmed the averaging hypothesis.

Two

That is,

HHM+M+ sets yielded a less favorable response or impression than HH
sets.

Similarly, for negative information, LLM_M_ sets yielded a less

unfavorable response than LL sets.

This result has been verified

repeatedly (e.g., Anderson, 1968; Anderson & Alexander, 1971; Hendrick, 1968; Lampel & Anderson, 1968; Oden & Anderson, 1971).

Ander-

son has concluded that since the weighted average formula accounts
for very extensive sets of social judgment data, it may be considered
a basic psychological process.
Information Integration Processes of Children
If it is true that averaging is a basic psychological process
of adults, it would be interesting to determine whether children's
judgments of social stimuli are parallel to those of adults.

If,the

valuation and integration operations of children are similar to the
operations of adults, then judgments should be the same.

Butzin and

Anderson (1973) tested this hypothesis by having children of various
ages judge their liking for pairs of toys.

Specifically, ten younger

children (mean ages 6,2 years) and twenty older children (mean ages
9,7 years) judged individual toys and pairs of toys in terms of
how much they would like to play with them.
1. ng "

To insure equal "weight-

o f the pairs of toys, children were instructed to make their

judgments contingent on the fact that they would have to play with
the toys an equal amount of time.

Across all age groups, an averaging
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mo del predicted their judgments quite well.

Toys judged of medium

likability paired with highly liked toys were judged somewhere
between the responses of the two toys alone.

Similarly, toys of

medium likability paired with highly disliked toys were judged
between the single toy ratings.
Hendrick, Franz, and Hoving (1975) also tested the averaging
model by having children make judgments of their liking of people
described by trait adjectives.

Specifically, kindergarten, second,

fourth, and sixth grade children (respective mean ages:
10~1;

5,9; 7,9;

and 11,0 years) judged individual and paired adjectives.

A

test of averaging was provided by comparing a positive and a moderately positive pair (HM+) with a single positive trait (H).

Converse-

ly, negative and moderately negative pairs (LM-) were compared with
negative singletons (L).

Pairs of traits yielded less polarized

judgments than the single trait ratings, indicating that children
also average trait information.

In addition, Hendrick et al. had

subjects rate the inconsistent trait pair "good" and "bad"--the
archetype of polar opposites.

Support for the averaging hypothesis

was again found when subjects rated the single traits "good" and "badn
as more polarized than the pairings of these traits.

On the basis of

these findings, Hendrick et al. suggested that averaging may be an
inherent process of the mind since young children have no formal
concept of the mathematical operation.
In light of other studies (e.g., Ernest, 1976; Gollin, 1958;
Livesley & Bromley, 1973) which have indicated that young children
have difficulty integrating information, it is interesting that both
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Butzin and Anderson (1973) and Hendrick et al. (1975) found support
for the averaging hypothesis.

Of course, any failure to integrate

information may be due to the stimulus materials in the particular
studies.

Since the traits should provide clearest control over the

nature of the stimulus materials, it might be tempting to conclude
that children can average information much as adults.

However,

children's "averaging" abilities may be limited to only two items,
since in the studies of Hendrick et aL and Butzin and Anderson, only
two traits (toys) were tested.

It also is possible that children may

have simply been expressing their uncertainty about pairs of traits
(toys) by making ratings falling between the single item ratings.
The exact processes children use remains obscured when judgments are·
based on only two items.

A better approach to examining information

integration processes of children then would involve the use of
several pieces of information.

However, results based on more than

two items should still be interpreted with caution since several
pieces of information may exceed children's memory capacity (Haith,
Morrison, Sheingold & Mindes, 1970).
In some ways it would be surprising if young children integrated or averaged information in the same T..vay as adults.

Many

studies have found differences in the weighting of the informational
components as a function of rater characteristics.

For example,

variations in "cognitive complexity," or the number of dimensions
employed in judging others, appear to affect the integration of
information.

Crockett (1965) has found that "low complexity" sub-

jects have less ability at synthesizing inconsistent information.
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"High complexity" subjects, on the other hand, are better able to
arrive at more comprehensive impressions.

Similar results have

been obtained using conceptually similar dimensions.

For example,

"high differentiators," defined by the ability to discriminate between interpersonal concepts, give more integrated or ambivalent
responses to inconsistent stimuli than do "low differentiators"
(Harvey, Hunt & Schroeder, 1961; Nidorf, 1961; Ware & Harvey, 1967)
and discriminate more between persons described by different sets of
information (Kaplan, 1968).

In general, the presence of certain

styles seems to increase the tendency to discount or ignore inconsistent information, resulting in univalent impressions.

This observa-

tion can be handled by the notion that some people place more emphasis (i.e., weight) on certain information components.

In light of

the effects of variations in cognitive styles, it seems somewhat
plausible that variations in cognitive abilities would also affect
the weight parameter in the integration of information.

In fact,

Kaplan (1975) notes that it would be instructive to examine developmental changes in integration processes.
There also may be another reason why children's organization
of stimulus information may not be comparable to that of adults.
Consistent with earlier cited research (i.e., Ernest, 1976; Gollin,
1958; Livesley & Bromley, 1973), children may not have the cognitive
abilities necessary to average information.

Preoperational children

(ages four to seven years), who have not mastered the principle of
invariance, might not be expected to average information.

The prin-

ciple of invariance refers to the ability to understand that objects
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or quantities are "conserved" and remain constant despite changes in
appearance.

Young children have difficulty comprehending this

principle largely because of their unidimensional perspective.

This

perspective limits children in thinking about objects as having
unvarying properties.

Much as children have to learn that the

physical world has stable and permanent ''inner" properties (e.g.,
that volume does not change with shape), they also may have to learn
that there are constant and invariant features in human behavior and
personality (c.f., Livesley & Bromley, 1973).

Children who have not

mastered the principle of invariance then may form impressions
differently than people who have mastered this principle.

For

example, inconsistent information may not appear inconsistent to
children \vho have not learned to expect constancy in personality
characteristics.
tency.

There may be no "need" to reconcile the inconsis-

Rather, the most salient or obvious features of the trait

descriptions will probably guide preoperational children's judgments.
For example, a person described by four likable traits (e.g., nice,
kind, smart, funny) may be rated similar to a person described by
one dislikable and three likable traits (e.g., mean, nice, smart,
funny).

Since the highest proportion of positive or negative infor-

mation will probably be the most salient, the likable traits will
determine preoperational children's judgments in the example.
II

An

unequally-weighted average" model then might be most descriptive of

the integration capacities of preoperational children.

That is, it

might be expected that preoperational children will ignore or discount inconsistent information and place most emphasis or weight on
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the most salient or highest proportion of either positive or negative
information in the trait set.
Concrete operational (ages seven to eleven years) and formal
operational children (over eleven years), who have mastered the
invariance principle, also would be expected to "average" trait information.

However, it might be expected that all the stimulus infor-

mation would be considered before a judgment is made.

Specifically,

they may try to bring "meaning" to conflicting information by arriving at a judgment reflective of all the traits.

Such a judgment

would be produced by a simple averaging of the scale values of the
traits, where all traits are given equal weights.

For example, a

person described by four likable traits would be rated as more likable than a person described by one dislikable and three likable
traits.

An "equally-weighted average" model would then be descrip-

tive of the judgments of concrete operational and formal operational
subjects.

Study I investigated these hypotheses by determining

whether subjects of various levels of cognitive development do differentially integrate or average trait information.
Valuation Processes of Children
Following Anderson's (1974) averaging model, differences in
judgments among subjects of various cognitive levels may not necessarily imply differences in integration processes.

Rather, any

differences simply may imply variations in the valuation operation.
Studies II and III were designed to investigate whether differences
in Valuation processes are found among different cognitive levels.
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The valuation process of adults is not always constant.

That

is, when presented with trait information, adults do not always
follow a simple averaging model.

The failure to follow such a model

indicates differential weighting of the traits.

Specifically, more

importance or value is placed on some of the traits at the expense
of others (assuming the sum of the weights equals one).

This differ-

ential weighting process is analogous to biases in the selection of
the information.

In a list of traits certain words seem to be

selected out as the basis of one's impression, while other traits
are ignored or given less emphasis.

In adult judgments, two pheno-

mena demonstrate differential weighting of the trait information-"set-size" effects and ''order" effects.
Set-size effects.

Set-size effects refer to the tendency of

larger sets of traits to be rated more extreme (either positively or
negatively) than smaller sets of traits--both being of the same
average value.

For example, a person described by the set of six

positive traits, "intelligent, sincere, good, kind, brave, happy,"
might be rated as more likable than a person described by the three
positive traits, "intelligent, good, brave."

Since the average value

of the larger set is the same as the average value of the smaller
set, a simple averaging model cannot explain this phenomena.
These set-size effects, however, can be mathematically represented if we assume a weighted average and make use of the internal
variable I 0

,

with value s 0 and weight w0

•

This internal state (I0

or initial impression with a scale value and weight is assumed to

)
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be averaged in along with the overt stimuli.

From equation (1),

.;s
the response t o a set· of "k" pieces of informat.;on
•
• ·.

+ kwi si
w0 + kwi

w0 s 0

(2)

A quantitative test of this model w·as provided by Anderson (1967).
That is, if the model is correct, then the estimates of w should be
equal, independent of set size.

Using a within-subjects design and

sets of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 adjectives of equal value, this was found
to be true.

The weights were nearly independent of set size, except

for a big jump in the set of six traits.

Replicating these sets

with the addition of a nine trait set, Anderson (1967) found this
jump to be produced by an end effect tendency.

That is, the jump

occurred for the set of nine traits in the second study.
A test of whether children weight information in the same way
as adults then might be provided by a test of this model.

Specifical-

ly, if set-size effects do not exist for children, this would indicate a reduction in stimulus weights across increasing set sizes.
Of course, an alternative explanation may be memory limitations of
younger children.

Set-size effects may not occur simply because

children do not have the ability to remember more than two or three
pieces of information at one time.
A test of set-size effects for children was provided by Cook,
Goldman, and Olczak (1975).

Elementary and high school subjects

(respective ages 12-13 and 17-18 years) rated the likability of persons described by sets of 1, 3, and 6 adjectives of equal value.
These stimulus traits were presented simultaneously.

Results
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. d" ated a strong set-size effect for each age group.

J.n J.C

This study,

however, was limited since preoperational children were not tested.
That is, 11 to 13 year olds would most likely be in the concrete
operational or formal operational phases of development, while the
16 _18 year olds would most likely be in the formal operational phase.
The extent to which set-size effects generalize to all cognitive
levels, then, is not known.

An adequate test of these effects would

entail examining the responses of younger preoperational children.
Livesley and Bromley (1973) contend that preoperational children's egocentrism leads them to view others as absolutely good or
bad.

If we assume this to be accurate, it would be somewhat sur-

prising if set-size effects were found.

That is, once a decision

of goodness or badness is reached, increasing the amount of information would not be expected to further polarize judgments.

This

would be reflected in the weight parameter where the weights of
larger sets would be lower relative to the smaller sets.

Differences

in valuation processes between preoperational children and the older
concrete operational and formal operational subjects, then, might
be attributed to the weighting of the stimulus information.
Valuation processes also might differ as a result of the "meaning" of the stimulus information.

Although traits may have similar

evaluative meaning, traits may vary in their denotative meaning.

A

young child's trait vocabulary may be less differentiated than the
vocabulary of adults.

Only as a child becomes older may traits be-

come less global in their implications and begin to take on specific
denot a t lve
·
meaning.

Although the exact implications a trait denotes
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has never been tested across different age groups, Livesley and
Bromley (1973) found that seven year olds as contrasted with older
children used fewer and more global terms in describing others.

If

trait implications are more global and diffuse for younger children,
this may mediate any set-size effects.

That is, presenting traits

of similar scale values to children may be tantamount to presenting
redundant information.

For example, presenting the traits "good"

and "smart" to children may be essentially redundant since one trait
may imply the other for the younger children.

This would not be

expected for older children and adults for whom traits have become
more differentiated and precise.
Past studies with adults have shown that redundancy does
attenuate any set-size effects.

For example, Dustin and Baldwin

(1966) investigated the effect of varying the degrees of redundancy
or judged implications between pairs of adjectives upon the overall
impression.

They found that the mean of the evaluations of the two

traits in isolation was more extreme than the evaluation of the
trait pairs.

Further, this difference in polarity tended to be

greater \vhen the t\vO traits strongly implied each other and least
when the degree of implication was weak.
Radtke (1967) investigated the effects of redundancy while
holding the mean evaluation constant.
repeating traits and by using synonyms.
pared to non-redundant sets.

Redundancy was created by
These sets then were com-

All sets were of equal size.

No

difference was found between judgments of sets containing synonyms
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and those not containing synonyms, although sets containing repeated
traits were judged less extreme as compared to synonym and nonsynonym sets.
Kaplan (1971) determined redundancy by having subjects select
traits from a master list which were implied by a given trait or by
having them rate the likelihood of one trait implying another.

For

both methods, redundancy was found to attenuate the set-size effect.
That is, increases in response polarity, with increased number of
descriptive traits, were greater in sets of non-redundant, as compared
to redundant, sets.

Kaplan concluded that redundancy of stimulus.

traits serves to reduce the weight associated with traits in the
impression formation process.

This is consistent with Schmidt (1969)

who earlier suggested that redundancy may operate by reducing the
information contained in a set of traits.

This, in turn, would reduce

the weight of trait components in the combination process.
If traits do have non-specific global implications for younger
children, then increasing the number of like-valued traits may be
psychologically equivalent to presenting redundant information.

If

this is so, we might expect a decrease in the weight parameter across
increasingly larger sets, while judgments remain the same.
Study II was designed to investigate whether set-size effects
are generalizable to preoperational children.
it is predicted that they would not.

For two possible reasons

The first because preoperational

children tend to be absolute in their judgments (Livesley & Bromley,
1973); and second, because traits may be more global or have broader
implications for preoperational children than older concrete
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operational and formal operational subjects.

Evidence that set-size

effects are not generalizable could indicate differences in valuation
processes of subjects of different cognitive levels.
Order effects.

If trait adjectives are presented one at a

time in succession (i.e., serial presentation), the order in which
they are arranged will usually influence the final judgment.

Primacy

effects occur when the first adjectives in a stimulus sequence influence the final judgment more than later appearing traits.

Such

effects are of interest since they imply variations in valuation
processes.

That is, the weights of the stimuli are contingent on

the order in which they are presented.

Specifically, if different

orders produce different responses, the "w" parameter cannot be constant, as has been assumed in the integration model (Anderson, 1974).
Asch (1946), first to investigate this phenomena, found a
primacy effect when inconsistent sets of trait stimuli were serially
presented.

Specifically, three likable traits followed by three

disliked traits produced a more favorable impression than the traits
presented in reverse order.

This primacy effect has been found in a

number of different studies (e.g., Anderson, 1965; Stewart, 1965;
Anderson & Norman, 1963; Hendrick, 1974).
Three explanations have been offered for these primacy effects:
"change in meaning," "attention decrement," and "discounting. 11

The

first, suggested by Asch (1946), explained the phenomena as due to
an actual change in meaning of the stimulus traits.

For example,

the trait "intelligent" may be viewed as positive when preceded by
traits such as "sincere" and "thoughtful," but may be vie\ved
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negatively when preceded by traits such as "cunning" and "shrewd."
The change in meaning hypothesis suggests that as a function of context, the scale value of a trait can change.

Other studies suggest,

however, that this hypothesis cannot adequately explain all the data.
For example, Tesser (1968), defining meaning as ratings on four
semantic differential scales, found that the "meaning" of traits did
not change as a function of serial position.

As an alternative

explanation, Tesser suggests the "attention decrement" and "discounting" hypotheses which would entail differences in only the weight
parameter of traits.

Specifically, the attention decrement hypothe-

sis (Anderson, 1965) assumes that the primacy effect is due to a
progressive decrease in attention over serial positions of a stimulus
sequence.

The discounting explanation assumes that the primacy

effect is due to a motivated discounting of later information in
order to resolve affective inconsistency between traits (Anderson,
1968; Anderson & Jacobson, 1965).
Although both attention decrement and discounting predict a
decrease in the weight parameter across a set of traits, the manner
in which the weights decrease would differ.

That is, discounting

would predict an abrupt change in \veight \vhen the inconsistency was
introduced.

Attention decrement, on the other hand, would predict

a smooth linear decrease in weights across the trait sets.

Hendrick

and Costantini (1970) tested these predictions and found a smooth
decrease in weights across inconsistent sets.

Again, the attention

decrement explanation would be in accord with these results.
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If weights do change across serial presentations of adjectives,
this suggests that adults are selecting or giving more emphasis to
earlier appearing adjectives.

Anderson (1974) offers two possible

explanations for this phenomena.

First, attention decrement may

result from a gradual crystalization of the impression across the
sequence.

As the impression becomes increasingly solid, new informa-

tion may be neglected as non-essential.

A second possibility is that

the integration mechanism becomes occupied with processing the adjectives already received so that the later traits have less influence.

Recent empirical evidence, however, casts doubt on this second

interpretation.

Specifically, Hendrick, Costantini, McGarry, and

McBride (1973) conducted a series of experiments varying the length
of the interstimulus time interval between traits in a set.
intervals varied from essentially zero to five seconds.

The

If subjects

tended to become preoccupied with processing earlier appearing
adjectives at the expense of the latter traits, the longer interval
should remedy this problem and eliminate any primacy effects.
Results indicated that varying the time interval had no effect on
the size of the primacy effect.
The idea of an early crystalization of one's impression as an
explanation for attention decrement deserves further attention.
This idea appears particularly attractive in light of other types
of research that have reported recency effects.

Using serial presen-

tations, research on psychophysical judgments (e.g., Weiss & Anderson,
1969; Anderson, 1973), decision-making (Anderson, 1964; Shantaeau,
1970, 1972), and attitude change (Anderson, 1959, 1973; Anderson &
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Farkas, 1973) have all obtained recency effects when the information
was serially presented.

These results are consistent with the

"crystalization of impressions" explanation for attention decrement.
That is, the knowledge that one is to make a psychophysical judgment,
decision, or form an attitude makes salient to the subject the
necessity of forming an impression based on all available information.
There is no reason to presume that the information will remain invariant throughout the stimulus sequence.
In person perception types of judgments, however, there is
reason to presume that the stimulus information describing the person
will remain constant or invariant.

That is, adults have come to

assume that an individual's personality
consistent.

chara~teristics

usually are

Thus, if we can form a coherent judgment based on only

part of the available information, there is no reason to maximally
attend to any additional information.

Attention decrement, then,

may ensue, accounting for any primacy effects.

This interpretation

also appears consistent with additional research in person perception
that has found recency effects.

That is, using methods that have

made all the traits in a set salient to subjects, various studies
have successfully eliminated the primacy effect.

For example, A."lder-

son and Hubert (1963) had subjects concomitantly recall the adjectives
and found recency rather than primacy effects on the overall likability judgments.

Stewart (1965) also found recency effects when

subjects made judgments after each trait was presented, and Hendrick
and Costantini (1970) found these same effects \vhen adjectives were
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pronounced by subjects as they were presented.

These studies share

in common the fact that response requirements necessitated that the
subjects attend to all the available information, thereby attenuating
any early crystalization process.
Preoperational children, who have not mastered the principle
of invariance or who have not learned to expect consistencies in
personality characteristics (e.g., Livesley & Bromley, 1973), may not
be expected to have an early crystalization of their impressions:
their attention should not decrease across a series of traits.
sequently, primacy effects would not be predicted.

Con-

Rather, young

children might be expected to attend to all the trait information as
it is presented, and base their impressions on the most salient
characteristics of the entire set of traits.

In sets of equally fre-

quent liked and disliked traits, the most recently preseDted information would be expected to be most salient.

Thus, recency effects

might characterize preoperational children's judgments,

rega:t;"dl~ss

·

of response requirements.
The idea that recency effects do shape young children's
impressions is also consistent with other research.

For example,

Cole, Frankelt, and Sharp (1971) found recency effects for young
children in free recall; Kun, Parsons and Ruble (1974) in achievement
judgments; and Feldman, Klosson, Parsons, Rholes, and Ruble (1976)
in moral judgments.

Theref~re,

it w·ould not be surprising if recency

effects also were found in the judgments of young children given a
serial presentation of trait information.

Of course, for larger
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sets of traits, recency effects for younger children may also be due
to memory limitations.
Study III was designed to investigate whether different order
effects are found for subjects of different cognitive levels.
Specifically, for adults and concrete operational children, who have
mastered the invariance principle, it might be predicted that they
will give greater weight to earlier appearing information (i.e., a
primacy effect).

Preoperational children, not expecting any consis-

tency in trait descriptions and limited in their recall abilitie_s,
would be expected to give more weight to later appearing traits (i.e.>
a recency effect).

Any differences in effects between cognitive

levels again would indicate variations in valuation processes.
Summary
In summary, three studies are proposed investigating the
development of social judgment processes.

Study I will investigate

whether children and adults "integrate" trait information in the
same manner.

It is predicted that the preoperational child's failure

to master the principle of invariance will attenuate an equallyweighted averaging operation.

Specifically, preoperational children

will base their judgments on the most salient or evaluatively frequent information in the stimulus sequence.

The older concrete

operational and formal operational subjects will attempt to integrate
any inconsistent information into their final judgment by following
an equally-weighted averaging operation.
Since differences in judgments between cognitive levels may
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not only imply variations in "integration" processes, but "valuation"
operations as well, two further studies are proposed.

Study II in-

vestigates whether "set-size" effects are generalizable to all cognitive levels.

Limited by the absoluteness of their perspective and

the broad implications traits may carry, preoperational children may
not form impressions based on the set size.

Specifically, increasing

the number of traits may reduce the weight associated with traits
in the impression formation process.

For older concrete operational

and formal operational subjects, these weights would be expected to
be constant across increasing set sizes, while judgments become more
polarized.
Study III investigates whether "primacy" effects are generalizable to all cognitive levels.

Since preoperational children may not

have learned to expect a consistency in trait descriptions, any
early "crystalization" of their impression may not occur.
attenuate any primacy effects.

This would

A recency effect might be predicted

on the basis that the preoperational child's limited recall abilities
may bias judgments towards the most recently presented information.
For the older concrete and formal operation subjects, primacy effects
would be predicted on the basis of the early crystalization hypothesis.

GENERAL HETHOD

Subjects_
One hundred forty....:four children and adults, seventy-t,.;ro males
and seventy-two females, from the Chicago area served as subjects in
three studies.

Forty-eight children defined as "preoperational"

(mean age approximately

6~6

years) and forty-eight defined as "con-

crete" (mean age approximately 9,4 years) by performances on Piagetian
tasks individually experienced and responded to a variety of stimulus
conditions.

These children were attending first and third grade

classes in the Evanston Public School System, District 65 (See Appendix 6).

Forty--eight college students, who were assumed to be at

the "formal" operational level, also served as subjects in the same
stimulus conditions.

These students were enrolled in·introductory

psychology classes at Loyola University and participated in the
studies for course credit.
Piagetian Tasks
Prior to the presentation of the stimulus conditions in all
three studies, the younger two groups of subjects were individually
tested to determine the Piagetian phase of cognitive development they
had achieved.

Because mastery of the principle of invariance and a

non-egocentric orientation may both be integral to the selection
and organization of stimulus information, the tasks used were meant
to determine the degree to which the children had acquired these
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abilities.

Specifically, the tasks used determined whether conser-

vation of mass was maintained (invariance test), and whether the
child could shift social perspectives (egocentrism test).

It was

assumed that mastery of the principle of invariance in physical
objects could be applied to the perception of people (c.f., Livesley

& Bromley, 1973).
Invariance test.

The first task, involving the assessment of

"conservation of mass," was performed by initially presenting each
child with two identical balls of clay.

After the child had been

instructed to examine the balls, the child was asked whether the
balls contained the same amount of clay.

If the child did not think

so, the opportunity was given to add or subtract clay from the balls
so that they were of equal quantity.

The experimenter then changed

one of the balls to a sausage shape while the child watched.

The

child was again asked whether the ball and sausage contained the same
amount of clay.

If the child said that they did, he or she was

asked to explain \vhy.

The child was classified as "passing" the

invariance test if a correct answer was given.
Egocentrism test.

The second task involved assessing whether

the children could take the social perspectives of other people.
inability to take another's perspective is one of the
acteristics of egocentrism (Flavell, 1968).

prim~ry

The

char-

Before children can

determine what other people are thinking or feeling, they must "decenter" from their own egocentric thoughts and feelings.

This ability

was tested by a role-taking task developed by Flavell (1968).
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Specifically, a series of seven pictures was shown to each child,
and the subject was asked to tell a story which the pictures illustrated.

Three specific pictures were subsequently removed and the

child was requested to predict a story another person would tell who
had not seen the entire set of seven pictures.

The pictures were

constructed so that the entire series suggested a certain story,
while the series of four suggested quite another different story.
This task constituted a role-taking problem under the following
interpretation.

During the second part of the task, the child pre-

sumably viewed the four picture sequence from a cognitive perspective
different from a person naive to the seven picture sequence.

This

"naive person" is supposed to see the pictures in isolation and "read"
them for the dominant story line which they suggest.

The egocentric

child, on the other hand, understands the new set of pictures simply
as elements taken from a previous whole (i.e., the seven picture
sequence) and construes them in terms of their meaning within the
whole.

The subjects' role-taking task, therefore, is believed to

consist of suppressing their own perspectives in favor of participating in the "naive other's" so as to interpret the data as the other
might interpret them.
The sequence of seven pictures (See Appendix A) was.intended to
elicit stories something like the following:

a vicious dog chases a

terrified boy who finds refuge by climbing a nearby tree; once
secure there, and with the dog abandoning the chase, he takes advantage of the kind of tree he happens to be in and eats an apple.

The
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four picture sequence was created by deleting cards 2, 3, and 5 (the
only cards which depict a threatening dog) leaving cards 1, 2, 6 and
7.

This set of pictures was designed to elicit a very different

story, of which the following might be an example:

a boy finds an

apple tree, climbs up to get an apple, and sits there eating it.

The

dog shown in the third picture in the sequence (card 6) is simply
part of the background and of no relevance to the story.

The instruc-

tions and procedures used were the following:
"Here are a series of seven pictures which tell a story."
The cards then were placed in the proper sequence on the
table. "You tell me what's going on. Begin here at the
beginning." Once the child had told a story, he or she was
instructed, "Now pretend you are someone else (perhaps a
friend) who hasn't seen all of the pictures, but only these
four." Cards 2, 3, and 5 then were removed. "Tell me a
story you think your friend would tell if he (she) sa1:v
these four pictures."
On the basis of the second stories the children told, they were
classified as "egocentric" (not passing the task), or "non-egocentric"
(passing the task).

That is, children were classified as "non-ego-

centric" if they told the "correct" four picture story, making no
reference to fear or the dog being the motive for climbing the tree.
Children were classified as "egocentric" if they made a specific
reference to fear or the dog as a motive, or did so during further
questioning.
Cognitive classifications.

If the child performed consistently

at one level across both tasks, it was assumed that the child was
operating at that cognitive level.

That is, children were classified

as "preoperational" if they failed both the conservation and egocentrism tasks, and "concrete" if both tasks were passed.

Those
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children passing only. one test were dropped from the study.

The

responses of the children to the stimulus manipulations then were
included in the final analyses as the operational definition of
"level of cognitive development."

The procedure for the presentations

of the tasks was similar for all three studies and occurred prior to
the presentation of the experimental conditions.

STUDY I

Method
The purpose of Study I was to determine whether preoperational
children differed from older concrete and formal subjects in their
integration of information.

Specifically, it was predicted that an

"equally--.;"eighted average" formula would best model concrete and
formal operational judgments, while an "unequally-weighted average"
model \vould best reflect preoperational judgments.
Design.

Twenty-four subjects (twelve males and twelve females)

at each of the three levels of cognitive development individually
heard and responded to five sets of four trait adjectives.

The order

of trait set presentations was counterbalanced across subjects in a
latin-square design.

Each set consisted of one of the five possible

combinations of positive and/or negative traits (e.g., PPPP; PNPP;
NPNP; NNPN;

1~NN).

set was randomized.

For each subject the order of traits within a
Further, half of the subjects at each cognitive

level were presented with evaluatively replicated trait sets (i.e.,
two different sets of positive and negative traits were used), and
two speakers were used to present the trait sets.
tested in Study I also were used in Study III.

Finally, subjects

Thus, the order of

presentation of studies was alternated across subjects.

The design

of Study I can be summarized as a three (cognitive level of development) by t\vO (trait replication) by two (sex of subject) by two
(speaker) by five (trait sets) factorial.
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Stimulus materials.

Ten liked (i.e., positive) and ten dis-

liked (i.e., negative) traits were selected from Hendrick, Hoving,
and Franz's (1974) list of children's likability ratings of trait
adjectives.

The selection of traits was made on the basis of non-

significant variations in ratings across kindergarten, second, fourth,
and sixth grades.
Each of the five trait sets that the subjects heard consisted
of different adjectives randomly selected from the list of traits
(See Appendix D).

Replication sets used the same adjectives with the

only stipulation being that any adjective appearing in one evaluative
order of traits could not appear in its replication.

Thus, any sub-

ject did not hear a given adjective more than once.
Prior to presentation of the five experimental trait sets, a
practice set of four randomly selected traits was introduced to
acquaint the subjects with the mode of stimulus presentation and the
dependent variables.
Stimulus presentation.

Prior to presentation of the stimulus

information, subjects were given a brief introduction in which they
were told that the experimenter was going to tell them what a boy is
like and they were to guess hmv much they think they would like or
dislike him.

Each subject heard and responded to six sets (1 prac-

tice, 5 experimental) of four adjectives.
a different boy's name.
good."

Each set was preceded by

For example, "Joey is nice, kind, smart,

Children, additionally, were instructed that the boy named

was someone they did not know, although this may not have been fully
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understood by all of the children.

Traits were presented by tape

recordings prepared by two different male speakers (speaker condition).
Each trait was played to the subjects at approximately one second
intervals.

After the set of four traits was presented, subjects were

asked to make a variety of judgments comprising the dependent variables.
Dependent variables.

Immediately after presentation of each

set of trait adjectives, subjects were asked to respond to two alternately presented scales.

Recently, Buchanan and Thompson (1973)

and Costanzo, Coie, Grumet, and Farnill (1973) have convincingly
shown the technical advantages of using rating scales in developmental
studies of judgments.

The first scale used was a modified version of

a pictoral rating scale developed by Ernest (1976) for use with
children.

This instrument portrays two sets of pictures, reflecting

likable and dislikable personality characteristics.

Specifically,

the "likable" set portrays a boy appearing happy and the "dislikable"
set a boy appearing angry.

It was an assumption that the pictures

reflect the affective reactions to the trait stimuli.

Each set

consists of three pictures similar in all respects except size.
Once the subject had expressed liking or disliking for the "target
set," the appropriate set of pictures was randomly displayed paired
with labels that the experimenter verbally presented.

For example,

the three "like" pictures in Set 1 (See Appendix B) might randomly
have been presented in order of diminishing size, and appropriately
labeled as "like him a whole lot; like him; like him a little bit."
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The subject then would be asked to point to the picture and verbally
state how "liked" was the target person.

Assigning a value to each

picture established a bi-polar six-point scale.
The second dependent measure, revised and shortened by the
author, was initially developed for a study using children by Morrison
and Mancuso (1974).

The Behavioral Prediction Test (BPT) consists

of five pairs of pictures.

Each pair depicts a stick figure engaging

in a good and bad behavior in a variety of home situations.

Subjects

were asked to indicate which behaviors the stimulus characters would
engage in.

Subjects indicated their choices by pointing to the

illustrated behaviors that they would expect from the actors described
by the trait adject1ves (See Appendix C).
Results
Subject~.

Seventy-two children and adults were tested with

the experimental tasks.

Twenty-four subjects were classified into

each of the three levels of cognitive development (i.e., preoperational, concrete, formal).

On the basis of chronological age, two

children 'vere expected to be operating at a preoperational level, but
passed the Role-Taking Task (RTT) indicating that they may have been
operating at the concrete operational level.

In accordance with the

classification criteria, these children were excluded from the study
and two other children substituted \vho had failed both tasks.

The

subjects' mean ages are presented in Table 1, broken-down by cognitive
level and sex.
Likability judgments: ANOVA.

A three (cognitive level of
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TABLE 1

Means and Standard Deviations for Ages of Subjects
Participating in Studies I and III

Cognitive Level

n

Mean

Standard Deviation

12
12
24

78.50
75.42
76.96

4.60
4.38
4.67

12
12
24

111.42
112.50
111.96

3.53
5.12
4.34

12
12
24

225.08
229.67
227.38

13.53
8.08
11.15

Preoperational
male
female
both
Concrete Operational
male
female
both
Formal Operational
ma1e
female
both

Note.

Means and standard deviations are presented by months.
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development) by two (trait replication) by two (speaker) by two (sex
of subject) by five (trait sequence) analysis of variance with subjects repeated across sequences was used to analyze the judgments of
liking.

The analysis of variance summary table along with the means

and standard deviations of the ratings made by the respondents at the
three cognitive levels are presented in Tables 2 and

3~

respectively.

Examination of Table 2 reveals no significant main effects for
level of cognitive development, trait replication, speaker, or sex of
subject.

However, a significant main effect was found for trait

sequence, F(4,192)

81.48,

~

<.001.

As the number of positive traits

in a sequence increased so did ratings of liking.

An unexpected

interaction also was found between trait sequence and trait replication, I(4,192)

= 12.00, £ <.01.

That is, replications elicited

different patterns of responses across the trait sequences.

In

replication 1 the PNNN set was rated higher (i.e., more dislikable)
than the NNNN trait sequence.

This is the reverse of replication 2

ratings, and what had been predicted.

In replication 2 the PPPN set

was rated higher than the PPNN sequence.

This is the reverse of

replication 1 and what also had been hypothesized.

It is possible

that these differences \vere due to the trait "terrible" which appeared
in the PNNN sequence in replication 1 and the PPPN sequence in
replication 2.

Although in replication 1 the mean scale value of

the PNNN sequence was slightly gerater than the NNNN sequence, the
denotative meaning of the trait "terrible" may have polarized judgments more negatively than the normative ratings might have indicated.
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TABLE 2
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Likability Ratings - Study I

Source
Cognitive Level (A)
Trait Replication (B)
Speaker (C)
Sex of Subject (D)
Ax B
AX c
AX D
BX C
BX D
CX D
Ax B X c
Ax B x D
AX CX D
Bx c X D
AX BX c X D
Error (bet>.veen)
Trait Sequence (E)
AxE
BX E
CX E
DX E
AX BX E
AX c X E
AX DX E
BX c X E
Bx DX E
CX DX E
Ax B X C X E
Ax B X D X E
Ax C X D X E
BX CX DX E
A X BxCxDxE
Error (within)

~-.E. <.05
**E. <.01
***E. <.001

MS
1. 43

.62
.07
.00
4.13
.48
3.34
5.14
4.67
.14
10.54
3.01
1.81
7.22
10.53
5.23
122.09
1.28
17.98
.44
.16
3.25
2.07
.55
1.46
.57
.91
1.94
. 90
1.62
.53
1.14
1.50

df

F

2
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
2

.27
.12
.07

.oo

.79
.09
.64
.98
.89
.03
2.02
.58
.35
1.38
2.01

4~

4
8
4
4
4
8
8
8
4
4
4
8
8

8
4
8
192

81. 48*i:*
.86
12.00**
• 30
.10
2.17*
1. 38
.37
. 97
• 38
.61
1.29
.60
1.08
.35
.76
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TABLE 3
Means and Standard Deviations for likability Ratings
Broken-down by Cognitive level and Sequence--Study I

Cognitive level

pppp

Trait Seguence
PPPN
PPNN
PNNN

NNNN

Preoperational
Replication 1 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

( .79)

2.83
(2. 08)

4.17
(2 .17)

5.08
(1.16)

(1. 76)

Replication 2 (n=12)
mean
(standard deviation)

1.42
(1.16)

3.50
(2 .02)

2.17
(1. 90)

3.67
(1. 97)

(1. 78)

Both Replications (n=24)
mean
(standard deviation)

1.42
( .97)

3.17
(2.04)

3.17
(2. 24)

4.38
(1. 74)

4.33
(1. 76)

Concrete Operational
Replication 1 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

1. 25

2.08

( .45)

( .90)

3.33
(1. 82)

4.67
(1.50)

4.75
(1. 22)

Replication 2 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

1.17
( . 39)

3.33
(1. 78)

3.83
(1. 75)

4.25
(1. 76)

5.08
(1. 50)

Both Replications (n=24)
mean
(standard deviation)

1. 21

2. 71
(1. 52)

3.58

( .41)

(1. 77)

4.46
(1. 61)

4.92
(1. 35)

Formal Operational
Replication 1 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

1.83
(1. 53)

3.92
(1.16)

5.42

(1. 23)

( .79)

4.08
(1. 31)

Replication 2 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

1. 33

3.75

( .78)

(1. 36)

3.25
(1. 48)

( .96)

(

Both Replications (n=24)
mean
(standard deviation)

1.58
(1. 21)

3.21
(1. 38)

3.58
(1. 35)

4.33
(1. 40)

4.83
(1.24)

Note.

1. 42

2.67

4.00

4.67

3.25

Mean ratings ranged from 1 ("like him a whole lot") to 6
("dislike him a whole lot").

5.58
.51)
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Further, since the cognitive level by replication by sequence interaction was only marginally significant (£(8,192) = 2.17,

~

<.05), no

serious problems are created with the interpretation of the results.
In fact, this interaction may be due to random error since a large
number of factors were involved in this study.

No other interactions

were significant.
Likability judgments:

planned comparisons.

Examination of

Figure 1 suggests that all three cognitive levels averaged the trait
information.

That is, as the proportion of negative adjectives in a

sequence increased so did judgments of disliking.

Further, trend

analyses (See Table 3) revealed that a linear trend accounted for
most of the variation in formal operational responses (F(l,92) =
~

82.57,

<.001), beyond which no other trends were significant.

concrete subjects, both linear (£(1,92)
quadratic trends (F(l,92)

= 6.15,

~

=

166.67,

~

For

<.001) and

<.05) were significant.

Finally,

while a linear trend also Has significant for preoperational responses

= 54.49,

(F(l,92)
~

~

<.001), so were the quadratic (F(l,92)

<.05) and quartic trends (£(1,92)
The

&~OVA

4.61,

~

4.44,

<.05).

was made to check for main effects and interactions

among the various factors.

However, specific hypotheses relating to

differences in ratings between sequences are tested by planned
comparisons

(~viner,

1971).

This approach is permissable since

differences in ratings within cognitive levels were predicted a
priori.

Specifically, for none of the cognitive levels was the

difference between PNNN and NNNN sequences significant, (formal:£
(1,192)

= 2.00,

~

>.10; concrete: F(l,l92)

= 1.68,

~

>.10;
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Figure 1. Likability ratings as a function of
trait sequences
lower numbers indicate more positive ratings

45
preoperational: .f(l,l92)

=

11.69, 2- <.01).

An analysis also was made of the degree to which subjects
"polarized" responses.

That is, deviation scores from the midpoint

of the likability scale (i.e., 3.5) were calculated.

At-test

revealed that the ratings of the preoperational children were more
polarized than the ratings of the grouped concrete and formal subjects

(~(70)

= 2.90, 2- <.01).

Although in Figure 1 it appears that

the mean ratings of preoperational children were less polarized than
older subjects, the greater degree of polarization of preoperational
children stems from the way that their scores were distributed.
That is, the combination of both extremely positive and extremely
negative judgments resulted in the mean ratings of preoperational
subjects being less polarized.

Differences in polarized ratings

between consistently positive (PPPP) and consistently negative (NNNN)
sequences were significant for all cognitive levels (formal:
2.40, 2- <.05; concrete:
2.41,

~

<.05).

~(23)

= 2.88,

~

<.01; preoperational:

~(23) =

~(23)

=

Consistently positive information was polarized more

toward the likable end of the scale than NNNN sequences were polarized
toward the dislikable end.
Likability judgments:

response distribution.

Although the

pattern of mean ratings across the sequences appeared similar for
the three levels of cognitive development, differences in response
distributions may have produced the similar results (See Table 4).
It was hypothesized that in evaluatively mixed sequences the most
evaluatively frequent traits would be most salient to preoperational

TABLE 4
Percent Usage of Likability Categories Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Trait Sequence-Study I

Cognitive
Level

ppppa

"like him a whole lot"

preoperational
concrete
formal

"like him"

Likability Category

Percent ResEonses Across Sequences
PPPNb
PPNNc
PNNNd

NNNNe

--

--

--

79.2%
79.2%
75.0%

33.3%
20.8%
8.3%

37.5%
12.5%
0.0%

12.5%
8.3%
0.0%

8.3%
4.2%
0.0%

preoperational
concrete
formal

8.3%
20.8%
4.2%

8.3%
37.5%
29.2%

16.7%
25.0%
29.2%

0.0%
8.3%
12.5%

12.5%
4.2%
4.2%

"like him a little bit"

preoperational
concrete
formal

8.3%
0.0%
16.7%

25.0%
16.7%
20.8%

8.3%
12.5%
20.8%

20.8%
4.2%
16.7%

12.5%
0.0%
16.7%

"dislike him a little bit"

preoperational
concrete
formal

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
4.2%
20.8%

0.0%
8.3%
20.8%

8.3%
20.8%
25.0%

8.3%
25.0%
8.3%

"dislike him"

preoperational
concrete
formal

4.2%
0.0%
0.0%

8.3%
16.7%
16.7%

4.2%
25.0%
20.8%

20.8%
25.0%
16.7%

20.8%
20.8%
33.3%

25.0%
4.2%
4.2%

33.3%
16.7%
8.3%

37.5%
33.3%
29.2%

37.5%
45.8%
37.5%

"dislike him a whole lot"
ax2(8) = 11.28, £ >.10
bx 2 (10) = 22.38, £ <.05

0.0%
preoperational
0.0%
concrete
4.2%
formal
cx 2 (10) = 25.65, £ <.01
dx2(10) = 10.85, £ >.10

ex 2 (10)

= 11.79,

--

£ >.10
~

0'
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children and, thus, determine responses.

However, it is possible

that in mixed sequences the negative trait or traits are most salient
(c.f., Hamilton & Zanna, 1972).

Judgments based on such sequences

as PPPN then may be absolute, but in the negative direction.

This

may be determined by examining the distribution of polarized or
extreme responses.

Specifically, the most extreme response categor-

ies of "like him a whole lot" and "dislike him a whole lot" can be
combined, while the less extreme response categories are ignored.
Table 5 shows the percentages of subjects across trait sequences using
the two extreme categories.

Results suggest that preoperational

children are absolute in their judgments as evidenced by the high
percentages of polarized judgments.

Examining the PPPP and PPPN

sequences suggests that although the mean ratings of these sequences
were significantly different, high percentages of preoperational
children used the extreme response categories when making their judgments.

Specifically, 79.2% of the preoperational subjects rated the

PPPP sequences as either "like him a whole lot" or "dislike him a
whole lot," while 58.3% of the children also made polarized responses
to the PPPN sequences.

This finding is in contrast to the ratings

made by the concrete and formal operational subjects who were significantly less likely to rate the PPPN sequences in a polarized manner
(x 2 (2)

= 12.39, £ <.01).

That is, while 58.3% of the preoperational

children gave polarized ratings to the PPPN sequences, only 25.0% of
the concrete and 12.5% of the formal operational responses to the PPPN
sequences were polarized.

It then appears that although the mean

differences between PPPN and PPPP sequences were significant for all
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TABLE 5
Percent Polarized Likability Ratings by Trait Sequence - Study I

ppppa

Trait Sequences
PPPNb
PPNNc
PNNNd

NNNNe

Preoperational

79.2%

58.3%

70.8%

50.0%

45.8%

Concrete

79.2%

25.0%

29.2%

41.6%

50.0%

Formal

79.2%

12.5%

8.3%

29.2%

37.5%

Cognitive Level

Note.

Polarized responses are classified as judgments of either
"like a whole lot" or "dislike a whole lot." x 2s are based
on polarized judgments versus other judgments (i.e., nonpolarized judgments).

ax2(2)

0.00, .E.>.1o

bx2(2)

12.39, .E. <.01

c/(2)

21.07' .E. <.001

di(2)

2.21, E. > .10

ei(2)

.78, .E. >.10

49

cognitive levels, the processes by which preoperational children
arrived at their judgments was different from the processes used by
older subjects.
Examining the distribution of responses for the PNNN and NNNN
sequences (See Tables 4 and 5), reveals small differences in category
usage among cognitive levels.

As expected, neither the chi squares

for the PNNN or the NNNN sequences were significant.

Small differ-

ences in category usage also were found across the PNNN and NNNN
sequences, reflecting the non-significant differences in mean ratings
for each of the cognitive levels.

In fact, for preoperational

children there was a slight decrease in polarized judgments between
the

PN~~

(50.0%) and NNNN sequences (45.8%).

Although for the PNNN sequences all subjects appeared to be
"absolute" in their judgments (perhaps indicating a ceiling effect),
responses to the PPNN sequences suggest a different trend.

That is,

for the PPNN sequences, 70.8% of the preoperational children rated
these sequences in either a polarized positive or negative manner.
This is in contrast to the concrete and formal operational responses
of which only 29.2% and 8.3%, respectively, were absolute
21.07,

~

<.001).

Cx 2 (2)

=

These findings may reflect the preoperational

children's inability to integrate inconsistent information.

When

presented with evaluatively inconsistent traits, the preoperational
children appeared to judge others in an absolute manner.

Older

concrete and formal operational subjects may have taken account of
sequence inconsistencies by making less polarized judgments.
Likability judgments:

ordinal positions.

Analyses also were
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made to determine whether the ordinal positions in which the sequences
were presented affected responses.

A three (cognitive level of de-

velopment) by five (latin-.square position) analysis of variance was
made.

Results suggest no significant effects for either cognitive

level or the order in which the trait sequences were presented (See
Table 6).

In addition, no significant effect was found for the

interaction of these two variables.
To avoid any confounds with the order of presentations of the
likability and behavioral prediction scales, these scales alternately
were presented across sequences.

For example, a given subject might

receive the likability scale followed by the prediction scale for the
first sequence, the prediction scale followed by the likability
scale for the subsequent sequence, and so on.

A t-test revealed no

significant difference in likability ratings as a function of scale
order

(~(70) =

.11, E. >.10).

Since subjects who participated in Study 1 also participated in
Study III, the order in which the studies were presented was alternated across subjects.

No significant differences in judgments of

liking were found as a function of study order,
Behavioral predictions.

~(70)

= .26, E >.10.

The modified Behavioral Prediction

Test (BPT) was designed to further reflect judgments of liking.
That is, part of the reason for forming impressions of others is to
facilitate predictions of future behaviors (Kelly, 1955).

The under-

lying premise being that liking is closely linked with behavioral
expectations.

We not only like those who do good things, but implic-

itly base that liking on the assumption that the person will continue
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TABLE 6
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Likability
Ratings Based on Sequence Position - Study I

MS

df

Cognitive Level (A)

.29

2

.28

Latin-Square Position (B)

.94

4

.91

Ax B

. 55

8

.53

1.04

57

Source

Error

F
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to behave in positive ways.

Of course, to the extent that our be-

havioral expectations are violated, our judgments will be altered.
In the strictest interpretation of Anderson's averaging model, behavioral predictions cannot be made from the same stimulus information on
which the judgments of liking were based.

That is, the model stipu-

lates that judgments be made on the same evaluative dimension which
the stimuli were rated.

Since the traits were rated for "likability"

and not "predicted goodness," behavioral predictions are a step
removed from the stimulus information.

However, to the extent that

liking and behavioral predictions are psychologically linked, the
stimulus information should determine the subjects' behavioral predictions.
The BPT was scored so that low scores would reflect more positive predictions than high scores.

Correlations then could be calcu-

lated between the six-point likability scale and the six-point
prediction scale.

Since the lm.;r variation in responses within

sequences did not allow correlations to be made for each of the five
sequences, correlations were calculated for individual subjects across
sequences.

That is, Spearman's rho correlations were based on five

pairs of ranked scores resulting in three degrees of freedom.

For

preoperational children, correlations ranged from .025 to 1.0 with
a median of .850.

For concrete subjects, rho correlations ranged

from .450 to 1.0 with a median of .862, while for formal operational
subjects correlations ranged from .075 to .957 with a median of .838.
Clearly, for all cognitive levels the scales were highly related.
Behavioral predictions:

ANOVA.

As with the likability
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judgments, a three (cognitive level of development) by two (trait
replication) by t'vo (speaker) by t\vO (sex of subject) by five (trait
sequence) analysis of variance with subjects repeated across sequences
was used to analyze the behavioral predictions.

The analysis of

variance summary table along with the means and standard deviations
of the predictions are presented in Tables 7 and 8, respectively.
The effects found for the behavioral predictions generally
paralleled those found for the likability ratings.

Specifically, no

significant main effects were found for trait replication, speaker,
or sex of subject.

There was a significant main effect for cognitive

level, hmvever, which was not found for the judgments of liking.
Preoperational children made significantly more positive predictions
than the combined concrete and formal operational subjects

(~(70)

2.52, .E_ <.05), while no difference was found between concrete and
formal ratings

(~(46)

= .85,

.E_

>.10).

As expected, the main effect

for trait sequence again was significant, I(4,192)

=

60.41, .E_ <.001.

As the proportion of negative traits in a sequence increased, so did
the number of negative behavioral predictions.
The only significant interaction was between replication and
trait sequence, !(4,192)

11.10, .E_ <.01.

This interaction and

pattern of responses was simila.r to that found for the ratings of
liking.

That is, in replication 1 the

P~~

negative behavioral predictions than the

sequence elicited more

~~N

sequence, while in

replication 2 the PPPN sequence evoked more negative predictions than
the PPNN sequence.

This pattern of responses for predictions, in

part, may have been due to the denotative meaning of the trait
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TABLE 7
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Predictions - Study I

Source
Cognitive Level (A)
Trait Replication (B)
Speaker (C)
Sex of Subject (D)
Ax B
AX c
Ax D
Bx C
Bx D
C x D
Ax B X c
AXB XD
Ax C X D
BXCXD
Ax B x C X D
Error (between)
Trait Sequence (E)
AXE
Bx E
Cx E
DXE
AxBx E
AXc X E
AxDx E
B X C X .,
L
BXDx E
CX DXE
Ax B XC X E
Ax B x D X E
AX c X DX E
B X c X DXE
Ax B X c X D X E
Error (within)
*.E_<.05
**p <. 01
***p_ <.001

MS

df

17.77
2.50
.04

2
1
1
1
2
2
2

.71
9.56
2.27
10.00
16.04
2.18
1. 34
.05
10.52
13.02
3.21
3.54
4.84
141.65
2.59
26.03
3.42
1.50
3.00
2.48
2.42
3.34
3.08
1. 70
1. 28
1.65
1. 40
.43
2. 72
2.34

1

1
1
2
2
2
1
2
48
4
8
4
4
4
8
8
8
4
4
4
8
8
8
4
8
192

F

3.67*
.52
.01
.15
1.97
.47
2.07
3.31
.45
.28
.01
2.17
2.69
.66
.73
60.41***
1.10
11.10**
1.46
.64
1.28
1.06
1.03
1.42
1. 31
• 73
.55
.70
.60
.18
1.16
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TABLE 8
Means and Standard Deviations for Predictions
Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Sequence - Study I

Cognitive Level

Trait Seguence
PNNN
PPNN

PPPP

PPPN

Preoperational
Replication 1 (n=l2)
mean
standard deviation

.67
(1. 44)

1.92
(1.98)

3.08
(2 .11)

3.42
(1. 98)

3.08
(2.02)

Replication 2 (n=l2)
mean
standard deviation

( .62)

1.58
(2 .15)

.75
(1. 60)

2.08
(2 .27)

3.42
(2.06)

Both Replications (n=24)
mean
standard deviation

.46
(1.10)

1. 75
(2.03)

1.92
(2.18)

2. 75 .
(2.19)

3.25
(2.00)

1.00
(1. 76)

2.67
(2. 27)

4.42
(1.50)

4.08
(1.56)

2.92
(1. 93)

2.50
(2 .07)

3.00
(2.22)

4.58
(1. 44)

.25

NNNN

Concrete Operational
Replication 1 (n=l2)
mean
standard deviation

( .29)

Replication 2 (n=l2)
mean
standard deviation

( .87)

Both Replications (n=24)
mean
standard deviation

1.96
(2.05)

2.58
(2.12)

3.71

4.33

( .64)

(1. 99)

(1. 49)

Formal Operational
Replication 1 (n=l2)
mean
standard deviation

.33
(1.15)

1.42
(1. 50)

3.50
(1. 93)

4.50
(1.00)

3.83
(1. 03)

Replication 2 (n=l2)
mean
standard deviation

( .89)

(1. 47)

2.25
(1.96)

2.83
(2.12)

( .29)

Both Replications (n=24)
mean
standard deviation

.33
(1. 01)

(1. 91)

2.88
(2.01)

3.67
(1. 83)

( .92)

Note.

.08

.25

.17

• 33

3.83

2.62

4.92

4.38

Mean ratings ranged from 0 (no negative predictions) to 5 (five
negative predictions).

56
"terrible."

Since the replication by sequence by cognitive level

interaction was not significant (!(8,192)

= 1.92,

~

>.10), variations

in predictions among cognitive levels are not confounded with replications.
Behavioral predictions:

planned comparisons.

As found for

the likability ratings, behavioral predictions appeared to be a function of the proportion of positive and negative traits comprising
the stimulus sequences (See Figure 2).

That is, for each of the

cognitive levels, as the proportion of negative traits in a sequence
increased, so did the number of negative behavioral predictions.
Trend analyses indicated only the linear trends to be significant
(preoperational: F(l,92) = 58.38,
~

<.001; formal: F(l,92)

77.54,

~

<.001; concrete: F(l,92) = 229.91,

~

<.001).

Planned comparisons again were used for subsequent analyses.
It had been predicted that differences in predictions would be found
bet\veen the PPPP and PPPN sequences for concrete and formal operational subjects, but not for preoperational children.

Comparisons

revealed significant differences for all cognitive levels (preoperational: !(1,192)

= 8.54,

~

<.01; concrete: !(1,192)

formal: !(1,192)

= 26.88,

~

<.01).

= 16.43, £

<.01;

Similarly, it had been predicted

that differences in behavioral predictions between PNNN and NNNN
sequences

~vould

be found for older concrete and formal subjects, but

not for preoperational children.

For none of the cognitive levels

vlere these differences significant (preoperational: !(1,192)
~

>.10; concrete: !(1,192)

~

> .10).

=

2.00,

~

>.10; formal: !(1,192)

Further, for none of the cognitive levels \vere the

=
=

1.28,
2.57,
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Figure 2. Prediction ratings as a function of
trait sequences
• lower numbers indic3te more positive predictions
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differences between PPPN and PPNN sequences significant (preoperational: !(1,192)

=

formal: !(1,192)
between

PP~~

(!(1,192)

.14,

~

>.10; concrete: !(1,192)

.32,

~

>.10).

=

2.00,

~

>.10;

Finally, although the difference

and PNNN sequences was significant for concrete subjects

= 6.48,

~

ational (!(1,192)
(!(1,192) = 3.21,

<.05), it was not significant for either preoper3.55,

~

~

>.10) or formal operational subjects

>.10).

Examination also was made of the degree to which subjects
polarized predictions.

Specifically, deviation.scores from the mid-

point of the prediction scale (i.e., 2.5) were
ses performed on these scores.

calculat~d

and analy-

No significant difference in degree

of polarization was found between preoperational and grouped concrete
and formal subjects'

(~(70)

= .23,

~

>.10) ratings.

This occurred in

spite of the fact that the mean prediction ratings of preoperational
children appeared to be less polarized than the older subjects (See
Figure 2).

Further, no differences in degree of polarization were

found between PPPP and NNNN sequences for any of the cognitive
levels (preoperational: !(23)
~

>.10; formal: f(23)

= 2.01,

Behavioral predictions:

1.77,
~

~

>.10; concrete: F(23) = .57,

>.10.

response distribution.

Examination of

Table 9 reveals no significant differences among cognitive levels in
distribution of responses for any of the trait sequences.

The major-

ity of subjects at each cognitive level made consistently positive
or negative predictions for each of the sequences.

This trend is

most clearly seen in Table 10 which shows that the distribution of
consistent responses was not significant for any of the sequences.

TABLE 9
Percent Usage of PreJiction Frequencies Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Trait Sequence - Study I
Negative Predictions

Cognitive
Level

ppppa

0

Preoperational
Concrete
Formal

75.0%
91.7%
87.5%

37.5%
37.5%
16.7%

45.8%
29.2%
20.8%

29.2%
16.7%
12.5%

16.7%
8.3%
0.0%

1

Preoperational
Concrete
Formal

16.7%
4.2%
4.2%

25.0%
16.7%
25.0%

12.5%
8.3%
8.3%

8.3%
0.0%
4.2%

8.3%
0.0%
0.0%

2

Preoperational
Concrete
Formal

4.2%
0.0%
0.0%

12.5%
12.5%
4.2%

4.2%
12.5%
12.5%

8.3%
12.5%
8.3%

12.5%
4.2%
4.2%

3

Preoperational
Concrete
Formal

0.0%
4.2%
4.2%

0.0%
0.0%
8.3%

4.2%
8.3%
16.7%

4.2%
4.2%
8.3%

4.2%
0.0%
16.7%

4

Preoperational
Concrete
Formal

0.0%
0.0%
4.2%

0.0%
12.5%
25.0%

8.3%
8.3%
4.2%

12.5%
0.0%
12.5%

12.5%
12.5%
16.7%

5

Preoperational
Concrete
Formal

4.2%
0.0%
0.0%

25.0%
20.8%
20.8%

25.0%
33.3%
37.5%

37.5%
66.7%
54.2%

45.8%
75.0%
62.5%

ax 2 (10) = 10.43, ~ >.10
bx 2 (10) = 14.04, ~ >.10

cx2(10) = 6.87, p >.10
dx 2 (10) = 9.59, ~ >.lo

Percent Responses Across Sequences
PPPNb
PPNNc
PNNNd
NNNNe

--

--

ex2(10) = 16.68, p <.10
-

V1
1.0
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TABLE 10
Percent Consistent Predictions by Trait Sequence - Study I

Cognitive Level

Trait Sequence
PPNNc
PNNNd

ppppa

PPPNb

Preoperational

79.2%

62.5%

70.8%

66.7%

62.5%

Concrete Operational

91.7%

58.3%

62.5%

83.4%

83.4%

Formal Operational

87.5%

37.5%

58.3%

66.7%

62.5%

Note.

NNNNe

Consistent responses are classified as either consistently
positive or negative predictions. x 2s are based on consistent
judgments versus other judgments (i.e., non-consistent
judgments).

ax2(2) = 1.63, .E_ >.10
bx2(2)

3.46, .E_ >.10

cx2(2)

.84, .E_ >.10

dx2(2)

2.21, .E_ >.10

ex2 (2)

3.27, .E_ >.10
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It then appears that the linear trends in predictions were due to the
proportions of subjects making consistently good or bad predictions,
and not due to within individual variations in predictions.

It is

interesting to note that although the behavioral predictions and
likability scale ratings were significantly correlated, the response
pattern of predictions was somewhat different than the distribution
of likability ratings.

The high correlations then may be due to the

low number of scores correlated and not due to actual parallels in
cognitive processes.
Behavioral predictions:

ordinal positions.

Further analyses

were made to determine whether the pos-itions in which the sequences
were presented affected behavioral predictions.

Although a signifi-

cant effect was found for cognitive level (F(2,57)

= 3.26,

~

<.05),

no significant effects were found for latin-square position or the
interaction of the two variables (See Table 11).
A t-test also was made to determine any effects of alternating
the likability and prediction scale presentations.
significant differences in predictions was found

As expected, no

(~(70)

= .02,

~

>.10).

In addition, a t-test indicated no significant difference in predictions due to alternating the order in which Study I and Study III
were presented

(~(70)

= .31,

~

>.10).

Conclusions
Likability judgments.

It had been hypothesized that differences

in information integration processes would be found between preoperational and older concrete and formal operational subjects.

That is,
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TABLE 11
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Predictions
Based on Sequence Position - Study I

Source

MS

df

F

Cognitive Level (A)

3.56

2

3.26*

Latin-Square Position (B)

1.08

4

.99

.61

8

.56

1.09

57

A

X

B

Error

*.£. <.05
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it was predicted that a simple (equal-weight) average model would
reflect the judgments of older subjects, while an unequal-weight
average model would represent preoperational judgments.

These differ-

ences would be reflected in variations in ratings both between the
PPPP and PPPN sequences and between the PNNN and NNNN sequences.
Specifically, significant differences in ratings between sequences
were hypothesized for concrete and formal subjects, but not for preoperational children.

For all cognitive levels the differences be-

tween PPPP and PPPN sequences were significant, while the PNNN and
NNNN differences were not.

These similarities in ratings among cog-

nitive levels might suggest similar integration processes, although
variations in trend analyses would question this conclusion.

That is,.

while linear trends were significant for all cognitive levels, the
quadratic and quartic trends also were significant for the preoperational responses.

These deviations from linearity are most clearly

seen in the similar ratings of the PNNN and NNNN sequences and of the
PPPN and

PP~~

sets.

A simple averaging model can explain the linear

trends, but cannot account for the "levelings" of trait sequences.
That is, for such a model to explain the preoperational pattern of
responses, the average scale values of the traits would have to change
between sequences.

If it is true that the stimulus values of the

individual components. do not change across contexts for preoperational
children, as it has been shown for adults (e.g., Anderson, 1971;
Kaplan, 1975), then the traits must be differentially weighted.
Specifically, the average weight of the negative traits in the PNNN
s.equences must be greater relative to the average weight of the NNNN
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sequences.

Further, either the negative traits in the PPPN sequences

must take on more weight relative to the PPNN sequences, or the positive information in the PPNN sequences must be weighted higher than
the PPPN sets.

Results then would indicate that preoperational

children were differentially integrating information.

That is, while

a simple average model might represent concrete and formal responses,
a weighted average model would be needed to reflect preoperational
judgments.
Differences among cognitive levels in percentages of polarized
responses to the inconsistent sequences also would suggest variations
in the integration processes of subjects.

That is, the relatively low

percentages of extreme responses made by the concrete and formal
operational subjects would suggest that neither the positive or negative traits were receiving weight disproportionate to their evaluative
frequencies in the sequences.

Rather, the low percentages of polarized

responses would indicate that concrete and formal subjects were averaging stimuli in a manner that all traits received equal weight.

In

contrast, for preoperational children the relatively high percentages
of polarized responses to the inconsistent sequences would suggest
that children were disproportionately assigning weight to either the
positive or negative information.

It had been hypothesized for pre-

operational children that the most evaluatively frequent traits in a
set would receive the greatest weight and, thus, guide judgments.
Comparing PNNN and NNNN sequences, equal proportions of preoperational
children polarized responses in a negative direction.

For this to

occur, the negative traits in the PNNN sequences must have received a
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greater average weight relative to the NNNN sequences.

In contrast,

a much higher proportion of preoperational children made positively
polarized responses to the PPPP sets than to the PPPN sequences.

This

would suggest that preoperational children do not ahvays assign the
greatest weight to the most evaluatively frequent traits.

In fact,

one quarter of the preoperational responses to the PPPN sequences
were polarized in the negative direction, indicating a greater weight
assigned to the negative information.

For the PPNN sequences, the

positive and negative traits absolutely guided judgments with about
equal frequency, again suggesting individual variation among preoperational children in what information is assigned greater weight.

Since

examination of the trait sequences revealed no consistencies in what
characterized the sets polarized positively or negatively, differences
in polarization may be due to individual variations in trait meaning.
The conclusion that preoperational children differentially
integrate information is of interest for it questions the conclusion
of Hendrick et al. (1975) that simple averaging is an innate ability.
Hhen children were presented with inconsistent trait pairs, Hendrick
et al. found that children would rate the pairs somewhere between
their isovalent components.

These results were not due to subjects

differentially polarizing responses, since 70 of the 96 set ratings
were neutral as opposed to absolutely positive or negative.

However,

the possibility still exists that children may only be able to average
a limited number of stimuli.

Since only pairs of traits were used,

the results of Hendrick et al. then are not conclusive.

Presentations

of multiple trait stimuli then provides a better test of averaging

66

abilities.

The finding of the present study that cognitive levels

differentially integrate information would suggest that simple averaging is not an innate ability, but follows a developmental framework.
Such a conclusion is consistent with Gollin (1958) and Livesley
and Bromley (1973) who also concluded that social judgments follow a
developmental pattern from simple to complex.

This pattern may exist

because of preoperational children's unidimensional perspectives which
limit their abilities to discern invariant characteristics in others.
That is, in the same way that preoperational children may learn to
search for invariant properties in physical objects, they also may
have to learn to search for consistencies in others' behaviors and
characteristics.

Since preoperational children may not expect the

characteristics of others to remain invariant, inconsistent information may present no "integration problems."

That is, impressions

will be absolutely determined by the most salient information, while
inconsistent stimuli is simply not attended to or discounted.

This

process may be reflected in a weighted average model where either the
positive or negative stimuli receive greater weight.

Judgments then

will appear absolute in either the positive or negative direction.
Hhat information is "salient 11 to subjects \vas not determined in the
present research, and may result from individual variations in trait
meaning.
Once children master the principle of invariance and thereby
enter the concrete operational phase, impressions will be formed based
on the consistencies in the behaviors and characteristics of others.
To the extent that these behaviors and characteristics are constant
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across time and situations, dispositional attributions and impressions
can easily be made (Kelley, 1967).

However, when confronted with

inconsistent information, concre.te and formal operational subjects
still will try to form unified impressions by integrating even disparate stimuli.

Social judgments of older subjects then will be based on

the entire trait sequence averaged together, with positive and negative
information weighted proportionately to their evaluative frequency.
Behavioral predictions.

Although parallels in behavioral pre-

dictions would suggest that all cognitive levels similarly were·
averaging the trait information, the high percentages of consistent
responses does not support such a conclusion.

That is, differences

in mean ratings across sequences appeared to be due to the proportion
of consistently positive and negative predictions and not individual
responsea.

Further, it should not necessarily be concluded that sub-

jects cannot integrate inconsistent information when making behavioral
predictions.

The results simply may reflect the format of the behav-

ioral prediction test and not true similarities in cognitive processes.
That is, when

subj~cts

are asked to make a series of good or bad judg-

ments there may be a tendency to predict every action independently of
others and, consequently, remain consistent in one's judgments.

For

example, if presented with a PPPN sequence, a given subject might make
a positive behavioral prediction.

Subsequent choices also may tend to

be positive if each choice is made independently of the others.

The

failure to find differences in response distributions among cognitive
levels then may reflect the dichotomous choices of the BPT and not
necessarily an inability of older concrete and formal subjects to
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integrate information when making predictions.
Although in the present study the BPT ratings did not reflect
likability ratings, earlier developmental research (i.e., Ernest,
1976) using a similar BPT did find parallels in judgments between the
two scales.

The difference in the "successful" use of the BPT may be

due to the information on which the ratings were based.

That is,

Ernest (1976) had subjects base their predictions on a series of
behavioral stimuli (e.g., "John gave Gary a present").

Such a proce-

dure may have made salient to subjects the link between the behavioral
predictions and the behavioral stimuli on which the predictions were
to be based.

In the present study, the connection between the stimuli

and behavioral predictions may not have been as clear to subjects,
since the traits carried no direct behavioral implications.

STUDY II

Method
The purpose of Study II '"as to determine whether "set-s.ize"
effects generalized to subjects at different levels of cognitive
development.

Specifically, it was predicted that set-size effects

would not be apparent for preoperational children, while they would
for the older concrete and formal operational subjects.

Differences

in these effects among cognitive levels would suggest variations
either in the weighting or valuation processes of subjects, or in the
initial impression, w0 s 0

•

However, since the purpose was to study

the interaction of cognitive level and set size, it was assumed that
the initial impression would be the same for all cognitive levels.
Design.

A total of seventy-two subjects who had not partici-

pated in Study I were included in Study II.

Twenty-four subjects

(both males and females) at each of the three levels of cognitive
development individually heard six sets of trait adjectives.

The

order of trait set presentations was counterbalanced across subjects
in a latin-square design.

Each set was composed of one, three, or six

consistently likable (i.e., positive) or consistently dislikable
(i.e., negative) trait adjectives (i.e., P, PPP, PPPPPP, N, NNN,
NNNNNN).

These set sizes were chosen to replicate the Cook et al.

(1976) study as closely as possible.

The order of traits within a

set was randomized for each subject.

Additionally, half of the sub-

jects at each cognitive level heard different-trait sets matched for
69
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evaluation (evaluation replication).

Traits again were presented by

tape recordings prepared by two males (speaker condition).

Thus, the

experimental design was a three (cognitive level of development) by
two (valence of trait sets) by two (trait replications) by two (sex
of subject) by two (speaker) by three (set sizes) factorial.
Stimulus materials.

The ten liked and ten disliked traits used

in Study I also were used in Study II.

Each of the six trait sets

each subject heard used the same adjectives with the stipulation that
any adjective appearing in one set size condition could not appear in
its replication.

All adjectives were randomly selected for the sets.

Prior to presentation of the six experimental trait sets, a
practice set of four randomly selected traits was introduced to
acquaint the subjects with the stimulus presentation procedures and
the dependent variables.
The same instructions, mode of stimulus presentation, and dependent variables used in Study I also were used in Study II.
Results
Subjects.

Seventy-tw·o children and adults who had not partici-

pated in Study I were tested in Study II.

Twenty-four subjects were

classified into each of the three levels of cognitive development.
As in Study I, preoperational and concrete operational children were
differentiated on the basis of passing or failing both the RTT and
the conservation task.

All first graders tested failed both tasks,

indicating that they were operating on a preoperational level.

In

contrast, all third grade children passed both tasks, and, thus were
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classified as concrete operational.

College students again were

assumed to be operating at the formal operational phase of development.
Subjects' mean ages and standard deviations are presented in Table 12.
Likability judgments (positive set sizes):
based on positive

a~d

ANOVA.

Judgments

negative set sizes were analyzed separately,

since the large number of factors would have made higher order interactions uninterpretable.

For positive sets, a three (cognitive level

of development) by two (trait replication) by two (sex of subject) by
two (speaker) by three (positive set sizes) analysis of variance with
subjects repeated across set sizes was used to analyze the judgments
of liking.

The ANOVA summary table along with the means and standard

deviations of the ratings are presented in Tables 13 and 14, respectively.

Ps seen in Table 13, the only significant main effect was for
speakers, I(l,48)

= 5.46, £<.OS.

This effect was unexpected since

both speakers were of the same sex (i.e., male) and naive to the
experimental hypotheses.

Ynis effect does not obscure the interpre-

tation of any group differences, however, since speakers did not significantly interact with cognitive level.

No other significant main

effects or interactions were found.
Likability judgments (positive set sizes):

planned comparisons.

Examination of Figure 3 suggests an apparent set-size effect for only
the formal operational subjects.

That is, for formal subjects,

ratings became increasingly more positive as the number of positive
traits in a s.et increased.

However, trend analyses revealed both the

linear and quadratic trends to be non-significant for all the
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TABLE 12
Means and Standard Deviations for Ages of Subjects
Participating in Study II

Cognitive Level

Standard Deviation

-n

Mean

12
12
24

78.00
77.83
77.92

3.44
3.69
3.49

12
12
24

112.17
114.42
113.29

7.00
4.54
5.89

12
12
24

232.33
247.67
240.00

15.52
54.48.
39.95

Preoperational
male
female
both
Concrete Operational
male
female
both
Formal Operational
rnale
female
both

Note.

Means and standard deviations are presented by months.
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TABLE 13
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Likability
Ratings Based on Positive Traits - Study II
Source
Cognitive Level (A)
Trait Replication (B)
Speaker (C)
Sex of Subject (D)
Ax B
Ax D
AX D
Bx C
Bx D
Cx D
Ax B x c
AX BX D
AX c X D
BX c X D
AX BX CX D
Error (between)
Positive Set Size (E)
AX E
BX E
CX E
DX E
Ax B X 1<'.....
AX c X E
AX DX E
BX c X E
BX DX E
c X DX E
AxBxCx E
AX BX D X E
AxCxDx E
BX c X DX E
AX BX c X DX E
Error (within)
*.E. <.05

MS

df

1.56
4.74
7.41
.07
.57
• 35
.80
.91
.02
.17
• 30
.57
1.72
1.8-5
.24
1.36
1.26
1.09
.12
.34
1.20
.59
. 80
.65
.22
.70
.68
1.43
.78
.22
. 36
.28

2
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
1

1
2
2
2
1
2
48
2
4
2
2
2
4
4
4
2
2
2
4
4
4
2
4

F

1.15
3.49
5.46*
.05
.42
.26
.59
.67
.01
.12
.22
.42
1. 27
1.36
.18
2.24
1. 93

.20
.60
2.12
1.05
1.42
1.15
.40
1.24
1.20
2.63
1. 37
• 38
.65
.49
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TABLE 14
Means and Standard Deviations for Likability Ratings Based on Positive
Information Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Sequence - Study II

Cognitive Level
p

Trait Sequence
PPP
PPPPPP

Preoperational
Replication 1 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

1.25

1.25

1.17

( .62)

( .62)

( • 39)

Replication 2 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

1.58
( .90)

1. 92
(1.16)

1. 67
(1. 23)

Both Replications (n=24)
mean
(standard deviation)

1.42

1.58

( .78)

( .97)

1.42
( • 93)

1.50

1. 75
( .75)

1. 75
(1. 48)

1.50
( • 80)

Concrete Operational
Replication 1 (n=12)
mean
(standard deviaticn)

( .52)

Replication 2 (n=12)
mean
(standard d:eviation)

1.83

2.17

( .83)

( .94)

Both Replications (n=24)
mean
(standard deviation)

1. 67

1.96

( .70)

( .86)

1.62
(1.17)

Formal Operational
Replication 1 (n=12)
mean
(standard deviation)

1.58

1.17

( . 95)

( .51)

( .39)

Replication 2 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

2.08
( .79)

1.67
(1.15)

1.67
(1.23)

Both Replications (n=24)
mean
(standard deviation)

2.04

1.62

1.42.

( .86)

( .88)

( .93)

Note.

2.00

Mean ratings ranged from 1 ("like him a whole lot") to 6
("dislike him a whole lot").
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Figure 3. Likability ratings as a function of
positive setsizes
lower numbers indicate more positive ratings
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cognitive levels.

Planned comparisons of ratings further revealed

that neither the differences between three positive traits and one
trait nor the differences between three and six traits were significant for any of the cognitive levels.
Likability judgments (positive set sizes):
tion.

response distribu-

Another possible approach to determining set-size effects is

by examination of the frequencies of polarized or extreme responses.
If set-size effects are operative then ratings should become increasingly more polarized as the number of traits in a set increases.
Table 15 shows the distribution of categorical responses across cognitive levels and set sizes.

For formal operational subjects, the

frequency of "like him a whole lot" responses clearly did increase
with larger set sizes.

For concrete operational

children~

the fre-

quency of polarized responses did increase between sets of three
(33.3%) and six (66.7%) traits, but not between sets of one and three
traits (45.8% and 33.3%, respectively).

Consistent with the mean

ratings of preoperational children, no set-size effects were found for
polarized responses.

Specifically, across all set

sizes~

high per-

centages of responses were "like him a whole lot," suggesting a ceiling
effect.

Examining the distribution of responses across cognitive

levels within each sequence also reveals no significant differences
for any of the set sizes.
Likability judgments (negative set sizes):

ANOVA.

For negative

set sizes a three (cognitive level of development) by two (trait
replication) by two (speaker) by two (sex of subject) by three (negative set sizes) analysis of variance again was used to analyze

TABLE 15
Percent Usage of Likability Categories Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Positive Sequence - Study II
Percent Responses Across Sequences
Likability Category

Cognitive Level

"like him a whole lot"

preoperational
concrete
formal

70.8%
45.8%
25.0%

62.5%
33.3%
50.0%

75.0%
66.7%
75.0%

"like him"

preoperational
concrete
formal

20.8%
41.7%
54.2%

25.0%
41.7%
45.8%

16.7%
16.7%
16.7%

"like him a little bit"

preoperational
concrete
formal

4.2%
12.5%
12.5%

8.3%
20.8%
0.0%

4.2%
12.5%
4.2%

"dislike him a little bit"

preoperational
concrete
formal

4.2%
0.0%
8.3%

0.0%
4.2%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

preoperational
concrete
formal

0.0%
0.0%
"(). 0%

4.2%
0.0%
4.2%

4.2%

"dislike him"

preoperational
concrete
formal

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
4.2%
0.0%

"dislike him a whole lot"

ax2(6)

= 6.52,

~ <.10

b 2
X (8) = 12.10,

pa

~

>.10

pppb

c 2
X (8) = 4.75,

ppppppC

0. 01~

4.2%

~

>.10

-....)
-....)
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responses.

The ANOVA summary table along with the means and standard

deviations are presented in Tables 16 and 17, respectively.
In contrast to the ratings based on positive set sizes, for
negative information a significant main effect was found for cognitive
level, !(2,48)

= 3.64, £ <.05.

The mean rating of preoperational

children was significantly less negative than the mean rating of the
grouped concrete and formal operational subjects,

~(70)

= 2.42, £ <.05.

No difference in ratings was found between concrete and formal subjects.

A significant main effect also was found for the speaker

condition, !(1,48)

= 4.11, £ <.05.

That is, one of the speakers again

unexpectedly elicited more positive ratings.

This is the same speaker

for which more positive responses tvere given in the positive stimulus
sequences.
F(2,96)

The only other significant main effect was for set size,

= 9.69, E <.01.

Sets composed of three negative traits were

rated more negatively than single trait sets
and six trait sets

(~(71) =

(~(71)

= 3.49, £ <.001)

3.44, £ <.001).

The cognitive level by speaker interaction also was significant,
!(2,48)

7.83, £ <.01.

This interaction appeared to be due to

ratings made by preoperational children in one of the speaker conditions.

That is, the mean difference between speakers for ratings

made by preoperational children (3.61 versus 5.28) was greater than
the mean differences for concrete (5.08 versus 5.00) and formal subjects (5.22 versus 4.97).

Revietv of the tapes revealed no plausible

reason why this effect might have occurred.

The

o~ly

other signifi-

cant effect was for the cognitive level by trait replication by
speaker by sex of subject interaction, !(2,48)

3.92,

£ <.05.
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TABLE 16
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Likability Ratings
Based on Negative Traits - Study II
Source
Cognitive Level (A)
Trait Replication (B)
Speaker (C)
Sex of Subject (D)
Ax B
AX c
Ax D
BX c
Bx D
cX D
AX BX c
Ax B X D
AX CX D
BX CX D
Ax B X C X D
Error (between)
Negative Set Size (E)
AxE
BX E
CX E
DX E
Ax B X E
Ax C X E
Ax Dx E
B X C X E
BX DX E
c X DX E
Ax B X c X E
Ax B X D X E
AX c X DX E
BX c X DX E
Ax B x C X D X E
Error (within)
*£. <.05
**£. <.01

MS
9.43
.17
10.67
.67
2.79
20.29
3.93
1.85
1.18
.91
.06
2.92
1.59
.91
10.17
2.59
8.76
1. 59
2.76
.68
1.85
. 66
1. 24
2. 30
.42
2.03
1.00
.28
1.08
1. 41
1.12
.07
.90

df
2

1
1
1
2

2
2
1
1
1
2

2
2
1
2
48.
2
4
2
2
2
4
4
4
2
2
2
4
4
4
2
4
96

F

3.64*
.06
4.11*
.26
1.08
7.83**
1.52
.71
.46
• 35
.02
1.13
.61
• 35
3. 92*
9.68**
1. 76
3.05
. 75
2.04
.73
1. 37
2.54
.46
2.25
1.11
. 30
1.19
1.56
1. 23
.07
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TABLE 17
Means and Standard Deviations for Likability Ratings Based on Negative
Information Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Sequence - Study II

Cognitive Level

N

Trait Sequence
NNN

NNNNNN

Preoperational
Replication 1 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

4.58
(1. 68)

4.25
(2. 05)

3.92
(2.02)

Replication 2 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

5.17
( .94)

3.83
(2. 21)

4.92
(1. 24)

Both Replications (n=24)
mean
(standard deviation)

(1. 36)

4.04
(2.10)

4.42
(1. 72)

Concrete Operational
Replication 1 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

5.00
(1.13)

5.08
(1. 00)

( .98)

Replication 2 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

4.92
(1. 08)

4.50

5.42

(1. 24)

(1. 08)

Both Replications (n=24)
mean
(standard deviation)

4.96
(1.08)

4. 79
(1.14)

5.38
(1. 01)

5.58

4.75
(1.14)

( .52)

4.88

5.33

Formal Operational
Replication 1 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

( .67)

Replication 2 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

5.08

4.33

(1. 31)

( .78)

Both Replications (n=24)
mean
(standard deviation)

5.33
(1.05)

4.54

5.42

( .98)

( . 93)

Note.

5.50

5.33
(1.23)

Mean ratings ranged from 1 ("like him a whole lot") to 6
("dislike him a 1v-hole lot").
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Likability judgments (negative set sizes):

planned

c~arisons.

Examination of Figure 4 suggests curvilinear trends across set sizes
for all three cognitive levels.

That is, sets of six negative traits

and single negative traits were rated as less likable than sets of
three traits.

However, only for the formal operational subjects was

a quadratic trend found to be statistically significant, F(l,46)
13.46,

~

<.01.

For none of the cognitive levels did linear trends

add significantly to predictability.
using planned comparisons.

Additional analyses were made

Specifically, for preoperational responses

the difference between sets of three traits and one trait was significant (£,1,192) = 9.21,

~

<.01), while no difference was found be-

tween sets of three and six traits (£(1,192)

=

1.86,

£ >.10).

Rat-

ings made by concrete operational children showed the opposite
pattern.

That is, the difference between six and three traits was

significant (!(1,192)

= 4.51, £ <.05), but the difference between

three traits and one trait was not (£(1,192)

= .37,

~ >.10).

For

formal operational subjects, both differences were significant.

The

sets of six negative traits were rated as less likable than sets of
three traits (£(1,192)

= 10.15,

~

<.01), and single trait sets were

rated as less likable than the three trait sets (!(1,192) = 3.31,
~

<.01).
Likability judgments (negative trait sets):

tion.

response distribu-

Table 18 shows the distribution of categorical responses across

set sizes and cognitive levels.

Examination of only the "dislike a

whole lot" percentages suggests trends similar to those reflected in
the mean ratings.

That is, for preoperational children small
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Figure 4. Likability ratings as a function of
negative set sizes
lower numbers indicate more positive ratings

TABLE 18
Percent Usage of Likability Categories Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Negative Sequence--Study II
________P_ercent
Na

Re~ponses

NNNb

Across Sequences
NNNNNNc

"like him a whole lot"

preoperational
concrete
formal

4.2%
0.0%
0.0%

25.0%
0.0%
0.0%

4.2%
0.0%
0.0%

"like him"

preoperational
concrete
formal

0.0%
4.2%
4.2%

4.2%
4.2%
4.2%

16.7%
0.0%
4.2%

"like him a little bit"

preoperational
concrete
formal

8.3%
4.2%
4.2%

4.2%
8.3%
4.2%

8.3%
8.3%
0.0%

"dislike him a little bit"

preoperational
concrete
formal

29.2%
20.8%
4.2%

16.7%
25.0%
41.7%

20.8%
12.5%
4.2%

"dislike him"

preoperational
concrete
formal

8.3%
33.3%
29.2%

8.3%
29.2%
33.3%

4.2%
12.5%
33.3%

"dislike him a whole lot"

preoperational
concrete
formal

50.0%
37.5%
58.3%

41.7%
33.3%
16.7%

45.8%
66.7%
58.3%

ax2(10)

bx2(10)

=

12.54, .E. >.10
21.49, .E. <.05

cx 2 (10)

= 19.29, £<.OS
00
UJ
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differences were found in the percentages of polarized responses across
set sizes.

For concrete operational children, a large difference was

found between sets of six traits and three traits (66.7% versus 33.3%),
but not between three traits and one trait (33.3% versus 37.5%).
sistent

w~th

Con-

the significant quadratic trend found for formal opera-

tional subjects, large differences existed between six and three traits
(58.3% versus 16.7%) and between three traits and one trait (16.7%
versus 58.3%).

Within trait sequences significant differences in

responses among cognitive levels were found for both the NNN and NNNNNN
sequences (See Table 18).
Behavioral predictions.

As in Study I, the Behavioral Prediction

Test was used in Study II to assess subjects' use of trait information
in predicting behaviors.

The BPT was scored so that low scores would

reflect more positive predictions than high scores.

Correlations

between the likability and prediction scales then were calculated for
each subject across the six positive and negative set sizes.

For

preoperational children, rho correlations ranged from .286 to 1.0 with
a median of .914.

For concrete operational subjects the range was

.600 to 1.0 with a median of .950; while for formal subjects the range
was -.243 to .986 with a median of .907.

The results again indicate

that for all cognitive levels the scales were highly related.
Behavioral predictions (positive set sizes):

ANOVA.

For the

positive trait information, a three (level of cognitive development)
by two (trait replication) by two (speaker) by two (sex of subject)
by three (positive set sizes) analysis of variance with subjects

repeated across set sizes was used to analyze predictions.

The ANOVA

summary table along with the means and standard deviations for the
three cognitive levels are presented in Tables 19 and 20, respectively.
The only significant main effect was for trait replication,
F(l,48)

= 4.22, E <.05.

Unlike for the likability ratings, replica-

tion 1 elicited more frequent positive predictions than replication 2
(respective means, .17 and .52).

Since replications did not signifi-

cantly interact with set sizes, this effect could not be attributed
to any particular set size.

However, a predicted interaction was

found between cognitive level and set size, F(4,96)

=

3.54,

E <.025.

Examination of Figure 5 reveals a pattern of responses similar to
that of the judgments of liking.

That is, for preoperational children,

small differences were found among set sizes.

Thus, it is not sur-

prising neither planned comparisons of the differences nor linear
and quadratic trends were significant.

Further, neither the planned

comparisons nor trends for concrete responses were significant.

For

formal operational subjects, sets of three positive traits elicited
the fewest positive predictions.
and six traits (!(1,96)
trait sets (!(1,96)

That is, comparisons between three

= 7.34, E <.01) and between three and single

= 7.34, E <.01) were both significant.

As ex-

pected, trend analyses revealed only the quadratic trend to be significant (!(1,46)

= 15.61, E <.01).

Table 21 shows the distribution of the frequencies of negative
predictions across set sizes and cognitive levels.

For the positive

set sizes, the majority of subjects made consistently positive
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TABLE 19
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Predictions
Based on Positive Traits--Study II
Source
Cognitive Level (A)
Trait Replication (B)
Speaker (G)
Sex of Subject (D)
Ax B
AX c
Ax D
Bx G
Bx D
Gx D
Ax B x c
AX Bx D
Ax G x D
BX GX D
AX BX c X D
Error (between)
Positive Set Size (E)
AxE
BX E
GX E
DX E
Ax B X E
A X GX E
AxDx vu
BX c X E
Bx D X E
CX DX E
AX BX CX E
Ax B X D x E
Ax C X D X E
BX c X DX E
Ax BxCxDx E
Error (within)
*p <.05
**£ <.025

MS

df

1. 39

2

6.68
.02
3.63
2.12
2.12
• 36
1.50
1.18
. 67
1. 76
. 70
4.01
.07
.64
1.58
• 24
2.26
.13
.91
1. 35
.83
.78
.82
• 39
.46
.06
.63
.50
1.17
1.24
.46
.64

1
1
1

2
2
2
1
1
1

2
2
2
1

2
48
2
4
2
2
2

F

.88
4.22*
.01
2.29
1.33
1.33
.23
.95
.75
.42
1.11
.44
2.54
.05
.41

2

• 38
3. 54~~*
.20
1.42
2.12
1.30
1.21
1.28
.61
.72
.09
.99
.78
1.84
1.94

4

.71

4
4
4

2
2
2
4
4
4

96
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TABLE 20
Means and Standard Deviations for Predictions Based on Positive
Information Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Sequence--Study II

Cognitive Level

Trait Sequence
p

ppp

pppppp

Preoperational
Replication 1 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

( .65)

( .29)

Replication 2 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

.92
(1. 93)

(1. 50)

(1. 93)

Both Replications (n=24)
mean
(standard deviation)

.62
(1.44)

• 33
(1.09)

.50
(1. 41)

• 33

Concrete Operational
Replication 1 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

( .00)

Replication 2 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

( . 39)

Both Replications (n=24)
mean
(standard deviation)

( .28)

.00

.17

.08

Formal Operational
Replication 1 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

( .00)

Replication 2 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

( .62)

Both Replications (n=24)
mean
(standard deviation)

( .45)

Note.

.00

.25

.12

.ns
.58

.17
( . 39)

.00
( .00)

.08
( .28)

.25

.08
( • 29")

.92

.50
(1.45)
.42
(1.44)
.46
(1.41)

.08

( • 62)

( .29)

1.25
(1.14)

( .58)

• 75
(1.03)

( .45)

.17

.12

Mean ratings ranged froT'l. 0 (no negative predictions) to 5
(five negative predictions).
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TABLE 21
Prediction Frequencies Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Positive Sequence--Study II

Negative Predictions

Cognitive Level

pa

-

ax2(6)
hx2(8)

Percent Responses Across
pppb

Seque~ces

ppppppC

0

preoperational
concrete
formal

75.0%
91.7%
91.7%

87.5%
91.7%
58.3%

83.3%
87.5%
91.7%

1

preoperational
concrete
formal

12.5%
8.3%
4.2%

4.2%
8.3%
16.7%

8.3%
4.2%
4.2%

2

preoperational
concrete
formal

4.2%
0.0%
4.2%

4.2%
0.0%
16.7%

0.0%
0.0%
4.2%

3

preoperational
concrete
formal

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
8.3%

0.0%
0.0%.
0.0%

4

preoperational
concrete
formal

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

5

preoperational
concrete
formal

8.3%
0.0%
0.0%

4.2%
0.0%
0.0%

8.3%
8.3%
0.0%

= 6.52, £ >.10

= 15.20,

£ <,10

cx 2 (6)

= 4.60,

~ >.10
CXl
\.0
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predictions.

Although consistent with the mean ratings, formal oper-

ational subjects were less likely than others to make consistently
positive predictions for the PPP sequences (x 2 (8)
Behavioral predictions (negative set sizes):

= 15.20, ~ <.06).
ANOVA.

A three

(cognitive level of development) by two (trait replication) by two
(speaker) by t\vO (sex of subject) by three (negative set sizes)
analysis of variance also was used to analyze predictions based on
negative information.

The ANOVA summary table along with the means

and standard deviations for the three cognitive levels are presented
in Tables 22 and 23.
As seen in Table 22, significant main effects were found for
cognitive level (f(2,48)

£ <.01).

= 6.02,

~

<.01) and set size (!(2,96)

= 10.76,

Specifically, preoperational children made significantly

fewer negative predictions than grouped concrete and formal subjects
(!_(70)

=

3.55, £ <.001), while no difference was found between concrete

and formal predictions (!_(46)

=

.68,

~

<.10).

For the significant

set size ::1ain effect, three trait sets elicited fewer negative predictions than either six trait sets (!_(71)
trait sets (!_(71)

=

3.10,

~

<.01).

= 3.68, p <.01) or single

As hypothesized, a significant

interaction also was found between cognitive level and set size
(F(4,96) = 4.87,
predicted.

~

<.01), although the pattern of responses was un-

Figure 6 illustrates the mean ratings for each cognitive

level across set sizes.

Not surprisingly, neither the linear nor

quadratic trends were significant for concrete or formal subjects,
although for preoperational children a quadratic trend was found
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TABLE 22
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Predictions
Based on Negative Traits--Study II
Source
Cognitive Level (A)
Trait Replication (B)
Speaker (C)
Sex of Subject (D)
Ax B
AX c
Ax D
Bx C
Bx D
CX D
AX BX c
AX BX D
Ax C x D
BX c X D
AX BX c X D
Error (between)
Negative Set Size (E)
AX E
BX E
CX E
DX E
Ax B x E
Ax C X E
AX DX E
BX c X E
BX DX E
CX DX E
AX Bx CX E
Ax B X D X E
AX CX Dx E
BX CX Dx E
Ax B X c X D X E
Error (within)
*E. <.01

MS
11.43
1.50
4. 74
.07
2. 35
4.59
.23
.67
. 30
.02
.87
1. 86
2.42
1.50
.54
1.90
8.76
3.96
• 93
1.12
.62
• 38
1.69
.66
.04
2.17
• 06
.64
1. 88
.65
. 37
.02
. 81

df
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
48
2
4
2
2
2
4
4
4
2
2

2
4
4
4
2

4
96

F

6.02*
• 79
2.50
.04
1.24
2.42
.12
• 35
.16
.01
• 46
.98
1.28
• 79
.28
10.76*
4.87*
1.14
1.37
.76
.47
2.08
• 82
.05
2.66
.07
• 79
2.32
.80
.46
.02
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TABLE 23
Heans and Standard Deviations for Predictions Based on Negative
Information Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Sequence--Study II

Cognitive Level

N

Trait Sequence
NNN

NNNNNN

Preoperational
Replication 1 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

4.42
(1. 44)

3.17
(2. 25)

3.92
(1.93)

Replication 2 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

5.00
( .00)

3.25
(2. 26)

( .00)

Both Replications (n=24)
mean
(standard deviation)

4. 71
(1. 04)

3.21
(2. 21)

(1. 44)

5.00

4.46

Concrete Operational
Replication 1 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

5.00

4.67

4.92

( .00)

( • 89)

( .29)

Replication 2 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

4.83
( . 39)

4.67
(1.15)

( .00)

Both Replications (n=24)
mean
(standard deviation)

4.92

4.67

4.96

( .28)

(1. 01)

( • 20)

5.00

Formal Operational
Replication 1 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

4.75

4. 75

4.92

( .62)

( .45)

( .29)

Replication 2 (n=l2)
mean
(standard deviation)

4.67
(1.15)

4.58

5.00

( .67)

( .00)

Both Replications (n=24)
mean
(standard deviation)

4. 71

4.67

4.96

( .91)

( .56)

( .20)

Note.

Hean ratings ranged from 0 (no negative predictions) to 5
(five negative predictions).
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(_~(1,46) =

18.23, .E_ <.001).

For preoperational subjects, planned

compaYisons further revealed that behavioral predictions based on
three trait sets were less negative than both the six trait sets

= 23.02,

(I(l,96)

.E_ <.001) and the single trait sets (F(l,96)

= 33.14,

E. <.001).
The distribution of the frequencies of negative predictions
is shown in Table 24.

For all cognitive levels, high percentages of

respondents made consistently negative predictions.

The only devia-

tion from this pattern was preoperational children's responses to the
NNN sequences for which 25.0% were consistently positive (x 2 (10)

=

23.24, E. <.01).
Likability judgments and behavioral predictions:
tions.

ordinal posi-

Further analyses were made to determine whether the order in

which the sequences (both positive and negative) were presented
affected responses.

A three (cognitive level of development) by six

(latin-square position) analysis-of variance was made for both the
ratings of liking and the behavioral predictions (Tables 25 and 26,
respectively) •
For the likability ratings, a significant main effect was found
for cognitive level (!(2,54)

= 4.84,

.E_ <.05).

Preoperational children

made more likable ratings than both concrete subjects
.E_ <.05), and formal subjects

(~(46)

= 2.40, E. <.05).

(~946)

= 2.15,

However, no

significant effects were found for latin-square position or the interaction between position and cognitive level.

For the behavioral

predictions, no significant effects \vere found for cognitive level,

TABLE 24
Prediction Frequencies Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Negative Sequence--Study II
Percent Responses Across Seguences
NNNb
NNNNNNc

CognHive Level

Na

0

preoperational
concrete
formal

4.2%
0.0%
0.0%

25.0%
0.0%
0.0%

8.3%
0.0%
0.0%

1

preoperational
concrete
formal

0.0%
0.0%
4.2%

8.3%
4.2%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

2

preoperational
concrete
formal

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
4.2%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

3

preoperational
concrete
formal

0.0%
0.0%
4.2%

4.2%
0.0%
4.2%

4.2%
0.0%
0.0%

4

preoperational
concrete
formal

8.3%
8.3%
4.2%

12.5%
4.2%
25.0%

4.2%
4.2%
4.2%

5

preoperational
concrete
formal

87.5%
91.7%
87.5%

50.0%
87.5%
70.8%

83.3%
95.8%
95.8%

Negative Predictions

ax2(8) = 6.43, ~ >.10
bx 2 ClO) = 23.24, ~ <.Ol

cx2(6)

= 6.27,

~ >.10
'-"
V1
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TABLE 25
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Likability
Ratings Based on Sequence Position--Study I I

Source

HS

df

1.53

2

4.84*

Latin-Square Position (B)

.46

5

1.44

A

B

.56

10

1.77

Error

.32

54

Cognitive Level (A)

X

*E. <.05

F
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TABLE 26
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Predictions
Based on Sequence Position--Study II

MS

df

Cognitive Level (A)

.45

2

1.89

Latin-Square Position (B)

.46

5

1.94

A

B

.23

10

.96

Error

.24

54

Source

X

F
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latin-square position, or their interaction.
Finally, a

~-test

was made to determine whether the order in

which the likability and prediction scales were presented affected
responses.

(~(70)

liking
~

No significant differences were found in ratings of

= .50,

~

>.10) or behavioral predictions

(~(70)

1. 24,

>.10.

Conclusions
In conclusion, some evidence of set-size effects was found for
concrete and formal operational judgments, but not for ratings made
by preoperational children.

For likability judgments based on posi-

tive set sizes, formal responses tended to become more positive as
the number of traits in a set increased.

Further, the percentages of

positively polarized responses increased across the larger set sizes.
For concrete operational subjects, the percentages of polarized judgments increased between three and six trait sets, although the mean
differences \·Jere not significant.

As predicted for preoperational

children, ratings and percentages of polarized responses varied little
across set sizes.
For judgments of liking based on negative information, set-size
effects w·ere only found between three and six trait sets.

That is,

for concrete and formal operational subjects, six trait sets were
judged as less likable than three trait sets as reflected by both the
mean ratings and the increased percentage of polarized responses.
Preoperational judgments varied little between the three and six trait
sets.

Differences also w·ere found bet\veen single and three trait

sets~

99
although not in the predicted direction.

That is, both preoperation-

al and formal operational subjects rated the single trait negative
sets as less likable than the three trait sets.

However, only for the

formal operational subjects did the percentages of polarized responses reflect this trend.

For concrete operational subjects, no

significant differences in mean ratings or polarized responses were
found between the single and three trait sets.
The finding that set-size effects were not always inclusive of
single trait sets is surprising since previous research has found the
set-size effect to be a fairly robust phenomena (c.f., Sloan and Ostrom, 1974).

In part, this failure may be due to methodological lim-

itations of the present study and not refute other research.

Speci-

fically, the scale values of the single trait negative sets were
somewhat higher than the average scale values of the larger set
sizes.

Since sets were constructed by a random selection of traits

without regard to scale values, this procedure may have confounded
the results.

Typically, small variations in scale values can be

countered by increasing the number of sets judged, increasing the
number of subjects, or by using a broader range of set sizes.

Un-

fortunately, in the present study the limited attention span of
younger children and the number of children available did not allow
for these possibilities.
Methodological limitations also may explain '"hy few set-size
effects were found for behavioral predictions.

That is, for both

positive and negative set sizes, high percentages of subjects at each
cognitive level made either consistently positive or negative
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predictions.

These findings may be attributed to the format of the

Behavioral Prediction Test.

Specifically, subjects were instructed

to make a series of either positive or negative behavior predictions.
Such a procedure did not allow for "degrees" of predictions, but
forced the subjects to make absolute choices.

Differences in ratings

than can be arrived at only if variations in predictions are found
across the series of dichotomous choices.

Since predictions were

based on homogeneous sets, it is not surprising that high percentages
of responses were absolutely positive or negative.
Regardless of these limitations, the results do indicate variations among cognitive levels in valuation processes.

While lika-

bility ratings of preoperational children were generally constant
across set sizes, concrete and formal subjects tended to polarize
the six trait sets.

Since the average scale values of the three

and six trait sets were approximately equal, the non-significant
differences between these sets for preoperational judgments \vould
indicate that the initial impression (I ) in the six trait sets
0

received less weight than in the three trait sets.

In contrast, the

polarization of the six trait sets by older concrete and formal subjects \·lOuld suggest that the weights of the initial impressions were
constant across the three and six trait sets.

These differences in

valuation processes may be due to variations among subjects in
cognitive abilities.

Specifically, if preoperational children's

egocentric or unidimensional perspectives lead them to perceive
others as absolutely good or.bad, then variations in the number of
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traits should have little effect once their impressions have been
formed.

In fact, relatively high percentages of polarized responses

were found across the trait sequences suggesting that absolute
impressions will be formed based on minimal information.

Once chil-

dren have entered the concrete operational phase, they may realize
that people, as well as objects, have constant or invariant characteristics.

Subjects then may learn to search for these consisten-

cies before making their judgments.

Larger set sizes may be more

reflective of this "consistency" than smaller set sizes and, accordingly, elicit more polarized responses.

STUDY III

Method
TI1e purpose of Study III was to determine whether "order
effects" generalized to subjects at different levels of cognitive
development.

Specifically, it was predicted that "primacy effects"

would be found for concrete and formal operational subjects, while
a "recency effect" W'Ould be found for preoperational children.
Differences in these trends for cognitive levels again would suggest
variations in the weighting or valuation processes of subjects.

For

example, if the trait set NNPP was rated as more positive than the
PPNN set, this would indicate that the most recent information was
receiving greater weight (i.e., recency effect).

In contrast, if

the NNPP set \vas rated more negatively than the PPNN set, this would
suggest that earlier appearing information was receiving greater
weight (i.e., primacy effect).
Design.
in Study III.

The same subjects tested in Study I also participated
The order of presentations of studies was alternated

across subjects.

In total,

seventy-t~vo

subjects (both males and

females) individually heard and responded to ten trait sets comprising both studies.
In Study III two evaluative inconsistent sets of four traits
were introduced.

For each of the sets, two of the traits were eval-

uatively positive followed by two negative traits and vice versa.
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That is, each subject heard and responded to the evaluative orders
PPNN and NNPP.

Two types of replication sets also were used.

That

is, replication sets were created by using different trait adjectives
(trait replication), and also by reversing the order of traits within
existing sets (reversal replication).

As example of reversal repli-

cations, the set "smart, glad, mean, angry,"might have had the complementary set "angry, mean, glad, smart."

The experimental design

then was a two (evaluative order) by two (trait replication) by two
(reversal replication) by two (sex of subject) by three (cognitive
level of development) factorial.
Stimulus materials.

The same traits used in Studies I and II

also were used in Study III.

Trait replication sets in both eval-

uative orders consisted of different adjectives (See Appendix F).

The

same instructions, mode of stimulus presentation, and dependent variables used in Studies I and II also were used in Study III.
Results
Subjects.

The seventy-two children and adults tested in Study

I also participated in Study III.
tions

broken-dow~

The mean ages and standard devia-

by cognitive level and sex were presented in Table

1.

Likability judgments:

ANOVA.

A three (cognitive level of

development) by two (trait replication) by two (reversal replication)
by two (sex of subject) by two (evaluative order) analysis of variance with subjects repeated across evaluative order was used to
analyze the judgments of liking.

The ANOVA summary table along with
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the means and standard deviations of the ratings for the three cognitive levels are presented in Tables 27 and 28, respectively.
No significant main effects were found for any of the factors,
although some interactions were significant.

For example, an inter-

action was found between trait replication and evaluative order
(I(l,48)

=

6.64,

£ <.05).

Specifically, a primacy effect was found

for replication 1 traits and a recency effect for replication 2 sequences.

In replication 1 the traits "wonderful/right" and/or "good/

funny" appearing first created the primacy effect, while in replication 2 the traits "mean/mad" and/or "silly/terrible" appearing last
created the recency effect.

This divergence in trends then was due

to differences in ratings in the PPXN order and not the NNPP order.
Since the mean normative ratings of the replication sets were equal
(rep 1: 3.64 and rep 2: 3.64), it is difficult to explain why this
interaction occurred.

Perhaps the denotative implications of the

traits "wonderful'' or "good" in replication 1, and "mean" or· "terrible11 in replication 2 led to the polarization of judgments.

Since

this interaction did not differentially affect cognitive levels, it
creates no real problems with the interpretation of other results.
A strong interaction also was found between reversal replication and evaluative order (I(l,48)

= 50.00, £ <.001).

That is, in

both evaluative orders (i.e., PPNN and NNPP), the sets "wonderful,
right, angry, bad" and "brave, smart, mean, mad" were judged as less
likable than the sets "good, funny, strange, unhappy" and "kind, glaq,
silly, terrible."

This effect cannot be due to differences in evalu-

ative meaning since the mean normative rating of the first two sets
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TABLE 27
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Likability Ratings--Study III
Source
Cognitive Level (A)
Trait Replication (B)
Reversal Replication (C)
Sex of Subject (D)
AX B
AX c
AX D
BX C
Bx D
CX D
Ax B X c
AX BX D
Ax C X D
Bx c X D
AX Bx CX D
Error (between)
Evaluative Order (E)
AxE
BX E
CX E
DX E
Ax B X E
Ax C X E
Ax D X E
BX CX E
BX DX E
c X DX E
A X B X CX E
AX BX DX E
Ax c X D X E
BX CX DX E
AX BX CX DX E
Error (within)

*E. <.05
**E. <.001

.HS

df

F

1.86
5.84
3.67
.01
.19
4.86
.19
3.06
2.51
.17
.08
2.03
1. 86
1.56
.58
2.73
. 01
2.03
10.56
79.51
.01
3.08
3.03
.69
5.84
4. 34
7.56
.36
.19
2.25
.56
.25
1. 59

2
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1

.68
2.14
1. 35
.00
.07
1. 78
.07
1.12
.92
.06
.03
.74
.68
.57
.21

2
2
2

1
2
48
1
2
1
1
1
2
2

2
1
1
1
2
2
2

1
2
48

.00
1.28
6.64*
50.00H~

.00
1.94
1.90
.44
3.67
2.73
4.76*
.23
.12
1.42
• 35
.16
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TABLE 28
Means and Standard Deviations for Likability Ratings
Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Sequence--Study III

Cognitive Level

Trait Sequence
PPNN

NNPP

Preoperational
Trait P~plication 1 (n=l2)
mean
standard deviation

2.75
(1.42)

3.17
(2.12)

Trait Replication 2 (n=l2)
mean
standard deviation

4.17

2.83

(1. 90)

(1. 75)

Both Trait Replications (n=24)
mean
standard deviation

3.46
(1. 79)

(1. 91)

Concrete Operational
Trait Replication 1 (n=l2)
mean
standard deviation

2.92
(1.56)

(1. 54)

Trait Replication 2 (n=l2)
mean
standard deviation

4.00
(2.04)

(1. 98)

Both Trait Replications (n=24)
mean
standard deviation

3.46
(1. 86)

(1. 75)

Formal Operational
Trait Replication 1 (n=l2)
mean
standard deviation

3.25
( .96)

(1. 56)

Trait Replication 2 (n=l2)
mean
standard deviation

(1. 24)

3.83
( . 83)

Both Trait Replications (n=24)
mean
standard deviation

3.42
(1.10)

(1. 24)

Note.

3.58

3.00

4.00

3.50

3. 75

3.42

3.62

Mean ratings ranged from 1 ("like him a whole lot") to 6
("dislike him a whole lot").
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were approximately equal to the rating of the second two sets (i.e.,
3.88 and 3.40, respectively).

Since these sets were used in both

evaluative orders, this difference obscures any primacy-recency effects.
That is, in one reversal replication this difference led to a primacy
effect, while in the other replication it led to a recency effect.
These opposite trends then conceal any differences among cognitive
levels in primacy-recency effects.
Finally, a significant interaction was found for sex of subject
by reversal replication by evaluative order (f(l,48)

=

4.76,

~

<.05).

That is, the above reversal replication by evaluative order differences were stronger for males than females.

No other interactions

were significant.
Unlike the previous studies, Study III did not include a "speaker"
condition in the ANOVA.

To do so would have necessitated doubling the

sample size to insure reliability of the results, and, further, would
have made interpretations of higher order interactions unwieldy.
Instead, subjects were selected for each speaker condition on the
basis of equal occurrences within the trait replication,. reversal
replication, and sex conditions (but not necessarily on the basis of
equal occurrences within the interactions of these conditions).
~-test

cant

was made between speaker conditions.

(~(70)

= 1.13,

~

A

Results were not signifi-

>.10), indicating no difference in judgments as

a function of the speaker presenting the traits.
Likability judgments:
also were made.

planned comparisons.

Planned comparisons

Examination of Figure 7 suggests differences among

cognitive levels in trends across evaluative orders.

That is, across
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Figure 7. Likability ratings as a function of
evaluative order
lower numbers indicate more positive ratings
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the PPNN and

~~p

sequences there appears to be a recency effect for

preoperational children's ratings and primacy effects for concrete and
formal operational judgments.

Hm..rever, for none of the cognitive

levels were these differences significant (preoperational: f(l,48)
1.58,

£ >.10;

£ >.10).

concrete: f(l,48)

= .64, £ >.10;

formal: F(l,48)

=

.13,

This failure to find differences is not surprising since the

reversal replication by evaluative order interaction may have obscured
any differences.
Likability judgments:

response distribution.

Table 29 shows

the distribution of responses across the various categories.

Although

for neither of the sequences was the chi square significant, there were
somewhat different patterns of responses across the three cognitive
levels.

That is, while preoperational and concrete operational chil-

dren tended to spread their ratings across the six response categories,
formal operational subjects tended to group their responses in the
middle categories.

This trend is most clearly seen when categories

are combined by extremity of response, ignoring evaluative meaning.
Specifically, "like a whole lot" can be combined with "dislike a whole
lot";

"like" with "dislike";

like just a little bit."

and "like just a little bit" with "dis-

For the PPNN sequences, 62.5% of the formal

operational subjects used the least extreme two categories (i.e., "like/
dislike just a little bit"), while only 33.3% of the preoperational
and 29.1% of the concrete children did so.

Although this distribution

of responses is somewhat different among cognitive levels, no differences in mean ratings were found since the corresponding positive and
negative response categories were used with approximately equal

TABLE 29
Percent Usage of Likability Categories Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Evaluative Order--Study III

Likability Category

Cognitive Level

Percent 'Responses Across Sequences
PPNNa
NNPPb

"like him a whole lot"

preoperational
concrete
formal

16.7%
16.7%
4.2%

29.2%
16.7%
0.0%

"like him"

preoperational
concrete
formal

16.7%
20.8%
16.7%

25.0%
12.5%
20.8%

"like him a little bit"

preoperational
concrete
formal

25.0%
20.8%
29.2%

8.3%
8.3%
29.2%

"dislike him a little bit"

preoperatioanl
concrete
formal

8.3%
8.3%
33.3%

8.3%
20.8%
25.0%

"dislike him"

preoperational
concrete
formal

12.5%
8.3%
16.7%

12.5%
25.0%
16.7%

"dislike him a whole lot"

preoperational
concrete
formal

20.8%
25.0%
0.0%

16.7%
16.7%
8.3%

ax2(10) ~ 14.79, £ >.10

hx2ClO) ~ 16.15,

E <.10

I-'
I-'
0
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frequencies by each of the cognitive levels.

However, the differ-

ences in response distribution are important for they may suggest
variations in the processes by which impressions were formed.

That

is, while formal operational subjects appeared to average the trait
information before making their judgments, younger subjects tended to
be more absolute in their responses.
For the NNPP trait sequences, similar non-significant differences in response distributions were found among cognitive levels.
However, preoperational and concrete children again tended to distribute their ratings across all response categories, while formal operational subjects appeared to group their responses in the center of
the scale.

As seen in Table 29, preoperational children also were

more likely to make judgments of "like a whole lot" and "like" (54.2%)
than concrete and formal subjects (29.2% and 20.8%, respectively).
This latter difference resulted in the apparent trend toward recency
found for preoperational children.

In contrast, older concrete and

formal operational subjects were more likely than preoperational children to make ratings of "dislike just a little bit" or "dislike"
(preoperational: 20.8%;

concrete: 45.8%;

formal: 41.7%), resulting

in apparent trends toward primacy.
Likability judgments:

ordinal positions.

The order in which the

PPNN and NNPP trait sequences were presented was alternated across
subjects.

That is, half of the subjects heard the PPNN sequences

first and the other half the NNPP sets first.

A t-test for the

difference in ratings of liking was not significant, ~(70)
.E. >.10.

= .27,
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The order in which Studies I and III were presented also was
alternated across subjects.

For Study III no significant difference
~(70)

in ratings of liking was found,
Behavioral predictions.

= 1.24,

~

>.10.

As in the previous studies, the BPT was

scored so that low scores would reflect more positive predictions
than high scores.

For the PPNN sequences, the Pearson correlations

between the likability and prediction scales were significant for
(~(22) =

preoperational
.851,

~

.706,

£ <.001) and concrete children

(~(22)

=

<.001), but only marginally significant for formal operational
(~(22)

subjects

= .297,

~

<.10).

A Fisher's r to z transformation

found the differences in correlations between preoperational and formal responses
responses

(~

= 1.88,

~

<.05) and between concrete and formal

= 3.08, £ <.01) to be both significant.

(~

The difference

in correlations between preoperational and concrete responses was not
significant

(~ =

1.20,

~

>.10).

For the NNPP sequences, the scales

were correlated significantly for all cognitive levels (preoperational:

~(22)

r(22)

=

= .696,

.442,

~

~

<.001;

<.05).

concrete:

~(22)

= .587,

~

<.001;

formal:

None of the differences in correlations

between cognitive levels was significant.
Behavioral predictions:

ANOVA.

A three (cognitive level of

development) by two (trait replication) by two (reversal replication)
by two (sex of subject) by two (evaluative order) analysis of variance
with subjects repeated across evaluative order was used to analyze
the behavioral predictions.

The ANOVA summary table along with the

means and standard deviations of the predictions are presented in
Tables 30 and 31, respectively.
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TABLE 30
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Predictions--Study III

Source
Cognitive Level (A)
Trait Replication (B)
Reversal Replication (C)
Sex of Subject (D)
Ax B
AX c
AxD
BX c
Bx D
CX D
Ax B X c
Ax B x D
Ax c X D
BX CX D
Ax B X c X D
Error (between)
Evaluative Order (E)
AxE
Bx E
CX E
Dx E
AX BX E
Ax C X E
Ax D X E
BX c X E
BX DX E
c X DX E
Ax BxCx E
Ax B X D X E
Ax c X D X E
BX c X DX E
Ax BxCxDx E
Error (within)

*E. <.05
**E. <.01
***p <.001

NS

7.52
11.11
.44
4.69
• 30
1.26
3.84
.25
.44
.00
2.64
10.59
1. 27
.03
1. 80
3.28
.69
3.01
1.00
169.00
6.25
1.90
4.52
1.02
6.25
2.78
18.78
.52
6.88
1.67
.69
7.92
1.89

df

2
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
2

48
1
2
1
1
1
2
2

2
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
48

F

2.29
3.39
.14
1.43
.09
.38
1.17
.08
.14
.00
.81
3.23
. 39
.01
.55
.37
1.59
.53
89. 49*•'~*
3.31
1.00
2.39
• 54
3.31
1.47
9. 94i'*
.28
3. 64i~
• 89
.37
4.20*

114
TABLE 31
Means and Standard Deviations for Predictions Broken-down
by Cognitive Level and Sequence--Study III

Cognitive Level

Trait Sequence
PPNN
NNPP

Preoperational
Trait Replication 1 (n=l2)
mean
standard deviation

2.00
(2.09)

2.00
(2 .13)

Trait Replication 2 (n=l2)
mean
standard deviation

3.00
(2.17)

1. 75
(2 .14)

Both Trait Replications (n=24)
mean
standard deviation

2.50
(2 .15)

1.88
(2.09)

Concrete Operational
Trait Replication 1 (n=l2)
mean
standard deviation

2.25
(2.18)

2.58
(2. 31)

Trait Replication 2 (n=l2)
mean
standard deviation

2.83
(2.04)

3.25
(2.26)

Both Trait Replications (n=24)
mean
standard deviation

2.54
(2.08)

2.92
(2.26)

Formal Operational
Trait Replication 1 (n=l2)
mean
standard deviation

2.75
(2.05)

2.50
(1. 78)

Trait Replication 2 (n=l2)
mean
standard deviation

3.33

3.25

(1. 56)

(1. 48)

Both Trait Replications (n=24)
mean
standard deviation

3.04

2.88

(1. 80)

(1. 65)

Note.

Mean ratings ranged from 0 (no negative predictions) to 5
(five negative predictions).
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As with the judgments of liking, no significant main effects
were found for behavioral predictions.

In contrast to the likability

judgments, no effects were found for the trait replication by evaluative order interaction.

However, the interaction between reversal

=

replication and evaluative order again was significant, !(1,48)
89.49,

.E._

<.001.

In both evaluative orders, the sets "wonderful,

right, angry, bad" and "brave, smart, mean, madtt were judged as less
likable than the sets "good, funny, strange, unhappy" and "kind,
glad, silly, terrible."

In one reversal replication these differences

led to a primacy effect, while in the other replication they led to
a recency effect.

These opposite trends again obscured differences

among cognitive levels in primacy-recency effects.
A significant interaction also was found for sex of subject by
reversal replication by evaluative order, !(1,48)

= 9.94,

.E._

<.01.

As

found for the likability ratings, the reversal replication by evaluative order differences appeared to be stronger for males than
females.

Finally, marginal effects were found for the cognitive

level by trait replication by sex by evaluative order interaction
(!{2,48) = 3.64,

.E._

<.05) and for the cognitive level by trait repli-

cation by reversal replication by sex of evaluative order interaction
(!(2,48)

= 4.20,

E. <.05).

However, the large number of factors

makes these interactions uninterpretable.
A !_-test was separately made for the speaker condition.

Af;

expected, differences in predictions elicited by the two speakers
were not significant, !_(70)

=

Behavioral predictions:

.27, E. >.10.
planned comparisons.

Planned
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comparisons again were made.

Examination of Figure 8 suggests a

recency effect for preoperational children and a primacy effect for
concrete operational subjects.

These were the same apparent trends

found for the likability judgments, although no primacy effect
appeared for the formal operational subjects.

However, for none of

the cognitive levels were the differences between
sequences significant (preoperational: F(l,48)
crete: £(1,48)

=

.89,

z

>.10;

Behavioral predictions:

formal: £(1,48)

=

PP~~

and NNPP

2.48,

~

>.10;

.18,

~

>.10).

response distribution.

con-

Table 32

shows the distribution of frequencies of negative predictions across
trait sequences.

Although the chi squares were not statistically

significant, examination reveals somewhat different patterns of predictions across the three cognitive

~evels.

For the PPNN sequences

preoper2tional and concrete children were somewhat more likely than
formal operational subjects to make either consistently positive or
negative predictions.

That is, 62.5% of both the preoperational and

concrete children made consistent predictions as compared to only
41.7% of the formal operational subjects.

For the NNPP sequences,

preoperational and concrete subjects again were more likely than
formal subjects to make consistent predictions.

Specifically, 66.7%

of the preoperational and 79.2% of the concrete operational children
made consistently positive or negative predictions as compared to
37.5% of the formal operational subjects.

Further, preoperational

children were more likely to make consistently positive predictions
or only one negative prediction (54.2%) than concrete (33.4%) and
formal (16.6%) subjects.

It was this tendency that resulted in an
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TABLE 32
Prediction Frequencies Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Evaluative Order--Study III

Cognitive Level

Percent
PPNNa

0

preoperational
concrete
formal

25.0%
29.2%
16.7%

41.7%
29.2%
8.3%

1

preoperational
concrete
formal

20.8%
4.2%
4.2%

12.5%
4.2%
8.3%

2

preoperational
concrete
formal

8.3%
20.8%
16.7%

16.7%
12.5%
33.3%

3

preoperational
concrete
formal

8.3%
8.3%
8.3%

0.0%
4.2%
16.7%

4

preoperational
concrete
formal

0.0%
4.2%
29.2%

4.2%
0.0%
4.2%

5

preoperational
concrete
formal

37.5%
33.3%
25.0%

25.0%
50.0%
29.2%

Negative Predictions

ax2(10)

= 18.03,

bx2(10)

=

17.64,

Respon~es

Across Sequences
NNPPb

£ >.05

E

>.05

f-'
f-'

co
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apparent trend toward recency in predictions for preoperational
children.

In contrast, 50.0% of the concrete operational children

made consistently negative responses to the NNPP sequences as compared
to 25.0% of the preoperational children and 33.4% of the formal
subjects.

It was. this tendency that resulted in an apparent trend

toward primacy for concrete operational children.
Behavioral predictions:

ordinal positions.

The orders in which

both trait sequences (i.e., PPNN and NNPP) and Studies (I and III)
were presented were alternated across subjects.

No differences in

predictions were found as a function of the sequence order (.!:_(70)
0.0, E_= 1.0).

=

However, a difference was found in predictions as a

function of whether Study I or III Has presented first.

Specifically,

subjects who heard Study I sequences first unexplainably gave fewer
negative predictions in Study III than subjects who were first
presented with Study III sequences (.!:_(70)

= 3.01,

E_

<.01).

Conclusions
Although differences between PPNN and NNPP sequences were not
significant for either the likability ratings or behavioral predictions,

C06~itive

levels diverged in the direction of their responses.

Specifically, for preoperational children there appeared to be a trend
toward recency in judgments, while for concrete subjects there
appeared to be a trend toward primacy.

For formal operational sub-

jects a trend tmvard primacy only \vas found for the judgments of
liking, while no difference was found for predictions.

These differ-

ences. appeared largely due to variations in ratings of the NNPP
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sequences and not of the PPNN sets.
Differences in trends may indicate variations in valuation
processes among cognitive levels.

That is, if different orderings of

the same adjectives elicit different responses, then the weight
parameter cannot be constant.

Specifically, preoperational children

may be assigning more weight to the later appearing adjectives in the
NNPP sequences, while concrete and formal operational subjects must
be giving greater weight to the earlier appearing adjectives.
differences may be due to variations in cognitive abilities.

These
Pre-

operational children, not having mastered the principle of invariance,
may not have learned to search for consistencies in the characteristics or traits of others.

Not expecting characteristics to remain

constant, an early "crystalization" of their impressions does not
ensue.

Rather, the impressions preoperational children form change

with the shifting information.

Since the immediacy of the latter

appearing traits may make them more salient, judgments tend to be
based on the most recent information.
In contrast, older concrete and formal subjects who have
mastered the principle of invariance have learned to expect consistencies in the behaviors and characteristics of others.

Thus, once

impressions are formed, older subjects may not fully attend to additional information even when it is inconsistent.

This early crystal-

ization of their impressions then results in more weight being assigned
to the earlier appearing adjectives.

That inconsistent information

still tends to be averaged into the final impression is indicated
by formal operational subjects making fewer polarized judgments than
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the younger subjects.
Primacy and recency effects may have been stronger if sets
containing more traits had been presented.

That is, sets of only

four traits may not have been sufficiently large enough for the early
c.rystalization process of older subjects to have become fully operative.

Hmvever, sets of six or eight inconsistent traits may have

made any interpretation of recency effects for preoperational children
difficult.

That is, an alternative explanation may have been the

inability to recall earlier appearing information.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
Although some of the hyptheses in the present studies were not
supported, results do indicate certain trends in the development of
impression formation processes.

However, before these trends are

reviewed, certain assumptions and limitations of this research will
be discussed.
Assumptions and Limitations
One of the primary assumptions of these studies was that the
verbal responses would be accurate reflections of the actual cognitive processes of the subjects.

That is, the ability to verbally

communicate one's thoughts may influence one's response capability
(Shantz, 1975).

Of course, this may be a potential confound in much

of psychological research, but it becomes a particularly salient
consideration when dealing with children.

The present research

attempted to limit the dependence on the children's abilities to
verbally co:m.."11unicate their thoughts by using pictoral and verbal
response measures.

Children were required to respond both by repeat-

ing the verbal expressions which they felt expressed their degree
of liking and by pointing to the pictures most reflective of those
impressions.

Further, the likability and prediction scales were

designed so that children would be "forced" to choose only among a
limited number of response alternatives at one time.

Additionally,

it was felt that using two different types of response scales would
122
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serve as a check on convergent validity of the response measures.
That is, it was felt that similar patterns of results derived from
two types of scales would provide greater confidence in the validity
of the responses than if only one had been used.

Certainly these

methodological approaches did not guarantee that responses \vere a
direct reflection of cognitive processes, but they did limit the confound with the children's abilities to verbally communicate their
thoughts.
Perhaps a more critical assumption was that the "meaning" of
the response categories comprising the likability scale would be the
same across all levels of cognitive development.

For example, it

was assumed that "like him a whole lot" would carry the same evaluative connotation for all subjects.

The validity of this assumption

is an important consideration, since children's abilities to use
interval scales have not been fully documented.

Thus, it is possible

that children do not differentiate between such categories as "like
him" and "like him a whole lotn in the same way as adults.

In the

present study it was assumed that the varying degrees of "liking"
and "disliking" -.;v-ere made salient through the dimension of size, in
addition to requiring all subjects to verbally label the pictures
most reflective of their judgments.

Although this approach did not

guarantee that the meaning was the same for all subjects, the pictoral and verbal stimuli should have highlighted the interval nature
of the response categories.
One limitation of the present studies had to do with the
dependent measures.

To insure simplicity and understanding of the
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likability scale, subjects w·ere first asked to make a decision of
whether they would "like 11 or "dislike" the target person.

Subjects

were subsequently asked to choose among three levels of liking or
disliking.
to six.

This approach limited the number of response alternatives

This limited variation within the scale may not have been

sensitive to the degrees of cognitive differentiation actually being
made by the subjects.

Thus, the scale may be assessing only the

"crudest" of differences among trait stimuli.

In addition, the lack

of a neutral or "I don't know" category may have eliminated a legitimate response.

That is, subjects may not have actually formed

any impressions.

Of course, "forcing" the subjects to form impres-

sions was the purpose of the research, but it may not accurately
reflect cognitive operations occurring under more natural circumstances.
The construct validity of the likability scale also might be
questioned.

That is, pictoral as well as verbal labels were used to

differentiate among response categories.

It is possible that the

pictures may have portrayed affective components not necessarily
reflective of liking or disliking.

For example, the "like him"

pictures also might be labeled as "happy" and thereby confuse the
children in making their ratings.

To minimize this confound, sub-

jects were required to apply the verbal label to those pictures that
portrayed their impressions.

This guaranteed that all subjects

had, at least, verbalized the concepts.

In addition, degrees of

liking and disliking were portrayed by the same "like" and "dislike"
caricatures--variations in degrees only being reflected in the
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gradient of size.

The same affective stimuli then were constant

across the degrees of "liking" and "disliking," minimizing the possibility that a given portrayal might differentially affect responses.
A further limitation of these studies is found with the Behavioral Prediction Test.

The large number of trait sequences to

which subjects were asked to respond necessitated that the original
ten-item scale be shortened to five items.

As with the likability

measure, this scale may not have been sensitive enough to pick-up
variations in actual cognitive processes.

Further, the forced-

choice format of the BPT did not allow subjects a neutral or "I
don't know" alternative.

Thus, the actual choice may not be reflec-

tive of those cognitive processes occurring in more typical settings.
Finally, the "meaningfulness" of the experimental procedures
might be questioned.

Although, as earlier stated, care was taken

to provide response measures and tasks that appeared significant
to younger children, the actual procedures may have been foreign to
them.

That is, the process of listening to stimulus traits and

forming an impression based on them may be unusual to children.

Pre-

operational children may have the cognitive abilities to form
impressions similar to concrete and formal subjects, but may not be
able to do so in the manner prescribed.

Further, it might be argued

that the procedures used forced the child to integrate the information in an artificial manner.

That is, the dependent measures

dictated that subjects form single unified impressions.

Such a

procedure then would not allow determination of other social judgmental processes such as aggregation of responses.
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The Development of Impression Formation Processes
Although trends in all three studies suggest differences among
cognitive levels in integration and valuation processes, few of the
critical cognitive level by trait sequence interactions were significant.

Thus, it cannot be concluded with certainty that different

cognitive abilities systematically affect social judgment processes.
In part, the failure to find significant interactions may be due to
several problems with the stimulus materials.

First, the selection

of stimulus traits was based on ratings made by kindergarten,
second, fourth, and sixth grade children (Hendrick, Franz & Hoving,
1974).

Although these ratings may be representative of the three

cognitive levels, the age groups were not the ones tested in the
present research.

That is, the judged likability of the traits for

first grade, third grade, and college subjects may be different from
the normative ratings.

Any systematic variations in evaluative

meaning of traits among cognitive levels would obscure differences
in judgmental processes.

Further, the relatively large standard

deviations of the normative ratings of younger children, and the
large standard deviations of preoperational judgments would suggest
wide variations among younger children in the evaluative meaning of
traits.

This large variability would contribute to the within group

error, further obscuring real differences in impression formation
processes.
Second, the failure to find significant interactions may have
resulted because the average normative ratings of the traits comprising each trait sequence were not systematically controlled.
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Traits randomly w·ere selected for each sequence without regard to
actual scale values.

Thus, the average scale values of the sequences

were not always similar, or deviated from each other in the wrong
direction.

For example, in Study II the mean ratings of the single

trait negative sets were more negatively polarized than the three
and six trait sets.
Finally, differences among traits on dimensions other than
judged likability may have confounded the results.

For example, the

standard deviations of the negative traits were larger than the
positive traits.

This may indicate systematic differences among

traits in "stability" as well as likability.

In the present research,

negative traits may have been more reflective of transient states
(e.g., angry) than positive traits which may have reflected more
enduring personality attributes (e.g., brave).

In combinations of

positive and negative stimuli, positive traits of higher stability
may receive greater weight than the more transient negative traits
(e.f., Edwards & Ernest, 1976).

Thus, without controlling the

stability of traits, the integration and valuation processes of
subjects would further be obscured.

In summary, the failure to find

the hypothesized differences among cognitive levels may be attributed
to the selection of stimulus materials.

Weaknesses in design, in

part, may be overcome by larger sample sizes or by having subjects
rate more trait sets.

Unfortunately, in the present research, the

limited time alloted to each subject and the limited number of
children available did not allm.;r for these possibilities.
Although results ,.;rere weak, the conclusion that impression
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formation processes follow a developmental frame>vork is consistent
with previous research on social judgments (e.g., Gollin, 1958;
Livesley & Bromley, 1973).

However, the advantage of the present

research is that it allowed greater control over the nature of the
stimulus materials.

That is, in earlier research there has been wide

variations across studies in the source and types of information given
and in judgments the subjects were asked to make (Schantz, 1975).
By using trait adjectives rated on the same dimension that the final
judgments were made (i.e., liking) the processes by which subjects
select and integrate information can be determined.

Of course, al-

ternative research strategies using trait stimuli may have been more
effective in exploring these processes.

For example, subjects might

be asked to form impressions after each trait in a set is introduced.
Such a strategy which does not rely on the final judgment might more
clearly demonstrate how impressions develop and change.

Subjects also

might have been asked to make other types of judgments than ones of
likability.

For example, subjects might express their degree of

certainty that various attributes are descriptive of a person characterized by a set of traits (c. f., Edwards & Ostrom, 19 71).

In

heterogeneous trait sets, older subjects may indicate an equal
weighting of traits by expressing a high degree of uncertainty about
highly favorable and unfavorable attributes.

Younger children may

attach a high degree of certainty to those attributes which are
evaluatively consistent with the traits they perceive as most salient
(i.e., an unequal weighting of traits).

Hmvever, the disadvantage
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of these approaches and of all approaches using trait stimuli is the
lack of generalizability to "real world" impression formation situations.

In actual social judgment situations we often receive more

and varied information about others.

Using traits as stimuli,

however, may serve as an initial step in exploring the unfolding of
impression formation processes.

Subsequent research may investigate

the generalizability of these findings to more realistic judgmental
situations.
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Study I Trait Sequences

Trait
Replication

1

mean ratings:

2

Trait Sequence
PPNN
PNNN

pppp

PPPN

funny
glad
good
smart

nice
happy
wonderful
wrong

kind
brave
bad
sad

right
mean
unhappy
terrible

angry
silly
mad
strange

2.04

2.55

3.85

4.94

4.68

brave
happy
wonderful
nice

smart
funny
glad
terrible

good
right
silly
mad

kind
strange
angry
sad

bad

unhappy
mean
wrong

NNNN

mean ratings:

·1.89

3.07

3.31

4.36

5.44

mean ratings
across
replications:

1.96

2.81

3.58

4.65

5.06

Note.

Traits were taken from Hendrick, Franz & Hoving (1974) list
of 22 trait adjectives rated by children. Scoring was done
on a 1-7 basis with 1 being the most likable.
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Study II Trait Sequences
Trait Seguence
Trait
Replication

1

mean ratings:

Positive
ppp

funny
smart
good
glad
brave
right

kind
nice
happy

\vonderful

silly
sad
terrible
angry
mad
wrong

bad
strange
unhappy

mean

2.17

1. 78

1. 67

5.20

5.05

5.90

good

mean
wrong
strange
angry
bad
unhappy

sad
mad
silly

terrible

nice
right
happy
glad
smart
funny
wonderful
kind
brave

2

Negative
NNN

pppppp

p

NNNNNN

N

mean ratings:

1.91

2.14

2.17

5.30

4.70

6.29

mean ratings
across
replications:

2.04

1.96

1.92

5.25

4.88

6.10

Note.

Traits were taken from Hendrick~, Franz & Hoving (1974) list
of 22 trait adjectives rated by children. Scoring was done
on a 1-7 basis with 1 being the most likable.
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Study III Trait Sequences

Trait
Replication

1

mean ratings:

2
mean ratings:
mean ratings
across replications:

Note.

Trait Sequence
PPNN

NNPP

wonderful
right
angry
bad

strange
unhappy
good
funny

3.84

3.45

brave
smart
mean
mad

silly
terrible
glad
kind

3.92

3.36

3.88

3.40

Traits were taken from Hendrick, Franz & Hoving (1974) list
of 22 trait adjectives rated by children. Scoring was done
on a 1-7 basis with 1 being the most likable.
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Nov8mber 1, 1977
Dear Parent:
The District has approved thp research proposal of Robert
<:rnest, a graduate student at IJoyola University ·t-rho is completing
the requirements for the Ph.D. in Psychology.
The research project involves reading to children lists of
adjectives that describe people. For example, "John is nice, kind,
smart, good. 11 On the basis of these trait descriptions, the children are asked hm.v much they would like such a person and then select,
from a series of cartoon drawings, situations that show the kind
of behavior such a person ;.rould display.
By studying the responses of the children, Hr. ~rnest hopes to
learn more about the processes by which children make judgments.
-:::ach child t.vill individually be questioned for no longer than 10
minutes. The child will not be identified in the study.

If you are Hilling for your child to participato in this
research, please sign your name at the bottom of this she8t and
have you child return it to school. If you have any questions
or concerns, please feel free to call 1~. ?rnest at Loyola University
(BR4-3000, extension 749).
Sincerely,

f/J/(.

( ;':'

,~ -~'

1·....

-+r......

•

child has permiss~on to participate in this study. I understand that no risk is involved and that I may wi thdra1v rrry child
from participation at any time.

r~

(signature of parent)

(date)
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The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that
any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation
is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content
and form.
The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
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